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PREFACE 
The first sixteen years of the history of Soviet/ 
Vatican relaticns represented one of the most profound 
ideological and political struggles of the twentieth 
century. Two powers were, perhaps, never more antithe-
tical to one another than the Roman Catholic Church and 
the Soviet Union. The ramifications of the conflict 
affected not only the Russian Roman Catholic communi-
ties, but also the attitudes of various Roman Catholic 
communities throughout the world. It seemed that, 
wherever the specter of Communism loomed, the Church 
underwent a time of trial. 
In America, the press' analysis of this awkward 
relationship greatly shaped opinion in virtually every 
church. It is fair to say that the ecumenical movement 
in the United States grew because of the Soviet policy 
of religious persecution. Many American clergymen 
equated the spread of Communism with the anti-Christ. 
A host of American newspapers and periodicals kept 
before the public the vision of a dangerous, atheistic 
government bent on the destruction of the civilized 
West. 
iii 
Wl:e.n exarnir .. ing th.e American press' assessment. 
of the Soviet/Vatican struggle, it is important to 
look at both the religious and secular press. The 
questions this st~dy will r2ise include thr22 points. 
Fi r st, how J. id the Arn~~r i can Catholic press ' COV(::r ;! g e 
and analysis c f events compare to that of the American 
secula~ p r ess? Secondly, how accurate were both jnsti-
tutions in their facts and judgments? Finally, what 
cha.nges o c cnrred iti. American soci2ty l)ecatrne of the 
O'I E:r ,3. l l CO 'V i~ r .3..qE! '? 
Representing the American Catholic press, thi~ 
study will use as its core three distinguished periodi-
ca 1 s : .f...rne r i ca , Cat 11 o 1 i c World , and Common we a 1 . These 
publications were significant because they reported 
interndtional events and issues. They also p~ovided 
1-,l1e Vaticar1 ~ ::3 'v'ie1jv·s 011 ·Cllt.1r:cl1/Si:.ate relatio11s. 
Representing the American secular press, reports 
fro 1~ per i o d i ca l dig 2 st .s , such a s I:!...i t er a r y D i_g es!:_ and 
Each published ar-
t i cl2s concerning the struggle, and each offe=ed a 
critical appraisal of events from various American a~d 
European newspa p ers. They also held a nationa1 circn.1.a--
tion. 
Commentary from the American secular press will 
· ~lso include assessmerits from Nation and The New Republic. 
Source material from American newspapers will 1)e limited 
iv 
to three : tlw C 1: i ca.go_ T :.d. bun e I the New York rr, j_ nH~ s , ctn d 
the .San Francisco Chronicle. These publications e~ch 
have impo r-tan t a :3pf~ct.2 for thj_ s study, but their cornme!1 ·-
t 21. r _y W i 1 ;_ b E:! l j_ ml. t e d m OS t 1 y to the Petro gT ad Cat ho l i C 
2lergy trial of March 1923. 
:S '7.: ca_ n s e of tr.~ E.~ l en gt h of t, i rn e fro rn J. 9 l 7 to }_ 9 3 3 , 
this stJ.6.y "';1.TJ..ll concentrate (:.>L the seven events that 
characterized the Soviet/Vatican conflict in the 
Arneri.cc..n press, These events include~ the two Russia~ 
revoluticrns of 1917, ths Genoa. confe-rence of 1922, the 
Petrograd Catholic clergy trial in 1923, the Papal 
famine re l ie f mission to Russia from 1921-1924, the 
Vatican's prayer crusade in 1930, and the recognition 
of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933. 
Schc-la.rJ.y so:irc~es, in English or in translation, will 
be used tu cla r j_ fy e -•,ren ts that were left unreported or 
poor J..y -3.ef ined. As an overall guide to Soviet/Vatican 
relations for this period, a copy of Hansjakob Stehle 1 s 
Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917-1981 (1981) is 
recommended. 
CHAPTER I 
THE MARCH REVOLUTION OF 1917 
Far from being a central issue in the American 
press' coverage of the first Russian revolution of 
1917, the condition of religion was little reported. 
This neglect was not a result of apathy. Rather, it 
resulted from the Russian Provisional Government's 
proclamation of liberty of conscience and religion. 
Most articles in the American press concentrated on 
basically two questions when reviewing the religious 
consequences of the revolution. First, how would the 
separation of Church and State affect the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and secondly, what status would 
minority religions have in post-tsarist Russia? 
From March to November 1917, four articles ap-
peared in the American secular press which assessed 
the condition of religion in Russia. The first ar-
ticle, published 12 May 1917 in the Literary Digest, 
characterized the separation of Church and State in 
Russia as a positive development. Commentary provided 
by Dr. William T. Ellis (1873-1950), a long-time resi-
dent of Petrograd and a reporter on religion for the 
Boston Transcript, held that the rejuvena~ion of 
both scholarly and socially conscious programs within 
the Orthodox Church seemed assured. To underscore his 
assessment, Ellis called the Holy Synod's decision to 
convoke a General Council and elect a patriarch an 
"event of I)romising historical significance. 111 
2 
Further optimistic assessment on the revival of 
the Russian Orthodox Church came from an article in the 
Independent. On 1 September 1917, it printed an article 
titled, "Russian Reformation. 112 It duly reported the 
meeting of the General Council and the bishops' choice 
of Metropolitan Tikhon of Moscow (1865-1925) as Patriarch. 
The article approved the Council's choice and the status 
as a El-" imus_ inter pares for Tikhon which made his condi-
tion similar to the Anglican and Lutheran Churches' 
bishops. 
Another article, appearing in Current Opinion, 
offered some positive commentary, but :it also noted how 
the previous August General Council of the Russian 
Orthodox Chur c h failed to provide a consensus. In early . 
-November 1917, the ar t icle titled, "Russia Looking For 
Spiritual Guida.nee," reported the overflowing crowds in 
churches throughout Moscow.3 Because of the strains of 
the Eastern Front war effort, noted the article, many 
sought consolation in the churches. The final analysis, 
however, suggested a lack of spiritual leadership. 
The last article appearing in the American secu-
lar press also noted the Orthodox Church's leadership 
void. In the Review of Reviews, an article appeared 
in November 191 7 titled, "The Holy See And The Russian 
Revolution. 114 Offering analysis from a French article 
in the Revue de Paris by Charles Loiseau, the Review 
3 
of Reviews• suggestion concluded that the March revolu-
tion of 1917 in Russia created a favorable climate for 
reunion between the Roman Catholic Church and the 
various Slavic Greek Orthodox churches in Eastern 
Europe. The final analysis surmised that: 
The Russians, Rumanians, and Serbs of the Greek 
Church find their destinies linked with the great 
Roman Catholic countries; and it may be presaged 
that the bonds now formed in the various walks of 
life will survive the war.5 
Overall, the assessments given by the American 
secular press detailed accurately events and issues on 
the condition of religion in Russia. The commentaries 
reporting the status of minority religions in Russia 
after the March revolution were uniform. Jews, Moslems, 
Protestants, and Roman Catholics were reportedly free 
from the restrictive Russian civil authority. Thus, 
the American secular press portrayed the era of the 
Provisional Government as a time when the policies of 
religious discrimination and persecution had ended. 
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Unlike the enthusiastic reviews in the American 
secular press, the American Protestant periodical, 
Missionary Review of the World, offered a more cautious 
assessment on the condition of religion in Russia. 
From May to August 1917, it published three articles 
with critical commentary. Overall, it provided the 
best understanding of an American periodical or journal 
On the significance of the March revolution regarding 
religious liberty. 
In its first article titled, "Russia on the 
Threshold of -- What?," the commentary provided suggested 
that the fluctuating military conditions on the Eastern 
Front and the precarious existence of the Provisional 
Government offered a poor environment for the growth of 
Christianity in Russia. Historically, noted the writer, 
the Christian religion prospered in its infancy in a 
large part due to the stable conditions of the Pax 
Romana of the Roman Empire. The volatile situation in 
Russia, furthermore, favored not the traditions of 
Christianity but rather revolutionary elements which 
were mostly anti-clerical and atheistic. Only political 
stability and peace, concluded the writer, would aid 
the strength ening of Christianity in Russia.6 
The second article also came in the May 1917 
i. SSUE~. It offered ten pa.g2s of r.::vents in Russia from 
March to May 1917. Basically, it approved the separa-
tiun of Church and Sta.t.1"2: . I t a 1 so p ..r a. i s e d the ;:10 v e roe n t 
to call a General Council in the Orthodox Church for the 
tion of the office of the patriarch. Nevertheless, the 
writer believed that there were se~ious obstacles tci 
reJ.igious grcwth. 
The Russian pec"..sa.nts, he ceincludc~d, we .re illit::"!r-
ate, and their religious practices bordered on super-
stition. Furtherrncre, the Orthodox clergy was inade-
quately trained, and the higher ecclesiastics were 
often lite.le more than civil bureaucrats. There was 
a .l s ·o no :., c, l ~ =~ a j_ agenda 2 n vi s i c- n. e d by the Cr tho d c x Church 
when the revolution occurred, and many clergymen favored 
-r~he re.turn of t r1e Tsar_ Overall, noted the writer, a 
religious reviva l in Russia woulJ be difficult to enact 
if the Or thodox clergy were re lied on to 2.ead it. 7 
The one hope for a relig:i. cm,s :cev~:.val caElG t"rorn 
fellow Protestant churches which could se~d missionaries 
to Russi a, the ·writer corr.nr.en ted. Indeed , Baptists, 
Methodists and Quakers already had members in the 
American Red Cross Mi~sion in Russia. With the declar-
ation of religio u s freedom granted by the Provisional 
Government, the writer concluded that these churches 
· could expand their members to include proselytizing.B 
The third and final article came in August 1917. 
Titled, "New Opportunities in Russia, Ii it offered a 
more positiv e forecast on the revival of Christianity 
after examining the Gene r al Council's convocation. 
The writer believed that the replacement of many 
Russian Orthodox bishops demonstrated a course toward 
independence from the civil government's tutelage. 
No longer acquiescent to rigid state control, the re-
ligious press also flourished. The official organ of 
6 
the Holy Synod; The Ecclesiastical News, became trans-
formed into a daily paper called The Ecclesiastical and 
Social Messenger of All Russia. In its renamed form, 
the restrictive and narrow Orthodox tenets under Tsarism 
gave way to religious debate. The Orthodox Church, con-
eluded the writer, seemed prepared to lead itself by 
consensus and not rely on the force of civil authority. 9 
In summary, the articles in the American secular 
press and in the Missionary Review of the World stated 
that the separation of Church and State was beneficial. 
The March revolution became a symbol in the American 
press whereby the Orthodox Church was freed from civil 
authority, and the toleration of other creeds began. 
Jews, Moslems and Roman Catholics enjoyed freedom from 
7 
state sponsored persecution. Undoubtedly, concluded 
some com!nentators, American miss i onary activity wou l d 
increase in Russia, notably among the Protestant churches . 
'rhe Vatican I s view of the March revolution was 
likewise optimistic but publicly more cautio1.;.s. The 
New York Times printed the Holy See's official reaction 
without commentary. 10 Ar t icles in the American Cathe.lie 
piess provided substantial assessment on the Vatican's 
attitude. The two positive developments noted from 
the revolution, offered in the American Catholic press' 
analysis, were political and religious freedom. First, 
the fall of the Tsar and the separation of Church and 
State meant that the regulation of the Roman Catholic 
Ch urch by the Imperial Ministry of Heterodox Religions 
·was over. Secondly, the Pope could name his own bishops, 
restructure the dioceses and establish religious educa-
tion programs. 
The first article concerning the March revolution 
appeared in the Jesuit periodical, America. An editor-
ial pul)lished on 14 April 191 7 titled, "Russia a..nd the 
Imprisoned Archbishop," demanded the release of 
Archbishop Andrew Sheptyckii (1865-1944). He was the 
leader of the Uniat Church in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire with jurisdiction over the Ukraine. 
commentary stated further that: 
'l7he articles' 
8 
If the new Government in Russia 1s to com~nand ttu~ 
respect of the worl~, it must g~2nt to its peo9le 
n~Yt msr-eJ.y civil indep£~ndence but tl:..e rlgLt to em-
brace and ~)ropagate the true reU. -:--J.icr1 (Roman Cat:.1·101-· 
icisrn) " 11 - . . 
The fj __ r.st dema.:1d the--: Provisi.onaJ. c~:ive:rnme-nt. 
gra ~'.1 ted, and A..cchbi shop She~yt, ych: :'. i trav 2 l c~d. i rnm,~c: i a tel~t 
~ft~r his release to Petrograd to org~niz2 an E~stern 
rite church in Russia loy3l to Rome. The second demand 
'w::1.s c1lso a-::-1s·1,\rc-~r.ed qu :t ckly. ?·J e 9 ct i a t i on E; b E~ t wt? c-.~ n th 1~ 
~')rcvisionaJ_ Governrne.:nt anci thG Roman Cathe.lie Ch1.2rc".::1. 
actur3.dy beqc1.n in March 1917. Bishop Edwdrd -~on der 
Ropp (1851-1939) of Vilno and Auxiliary Bishop John 
Cieplak (1857-1926) of Mogilev represented the Catholic 
Church's interests. A.long with 3everal other members 
of th s Co mm i s s ion f or the Liq u i d at i on () f th 0 A ff a i r s of 
the Prcvisional. Government which permitted , amcng 0ther 
thin;Js, th2 rigr1t to proselytiz2 in Russia. No I:. u n t j_ l 
1- :.,..-, - ,..,- o .... , .. ,. "' ·i cL-, .... .) .--, 1 ~ ,.J E. ,_ 0 J LlC:. t_. J 1...1. l., 1 ..L .... 1 , \:::. 'J. .• 
Th<~ comrn:.=mta .ry also noted how the Ca. tbol i c 
Sheptyckii dS the negotiator. It appeare d in the ar-
ticle:s assessment that the Archbishop 1 2 release rneact 
9 
churches since these churches followed the same ancient 
Greek ceremonies that Sheptyckii's Uniat Church usect. 13 
The most knowledgeable Catholic spokesman -1-' on l,ne 
Eastern church~s was the Italian Agustinian priest, 
the Reverend Aurelio Palmieri (1870-192~ . He wrote an 
article for the Catholic World, in August 1917, assessing 
the impact of the March revolution on the expansion of 
Catholicism. Palmieri concluded that the greatest re-
ligious challenge from the revolution was that the 
Russian intelligentsia was free from the rigid doctrines 
of the Orthodox Church. 
It was in this group, the intelligentsia, that 
Palmieri noted a bitter anti-Christian attitude. Be-
cause many of the political parties in Russia in 1917 
were led by this atheistic intelligentsia, Palmieri 
stated that the Roman Catholic Church needed to act 
with circumspection in the anti-religious atmosphere. 
He understood that the revolutionary character of the 
v~rious Russi.an political parties meant that unencumber-
ed religious freedom would not benignly follow the 
March revolution.14 
In September 1917, Palmieri wrote another article 
for the Catholic World. He seemed more optimistic and 
noted that the convocation of the General Council of 
the Orthodox Church would help to fu r ther a dialogue 
10 
between the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy. 
Reorganizing the Orthodox Church, Palmieri asserted, 
He praised the Orthodox clergy 
for con~enjng their General Council that August for 
the first time in almost two hundrRd years. In a purely 
religious atmosphere, Palmieri concluded, the Vatican 
had an opportunity to stress the common bonds of 
Christian beliefs and practices between Russian Ortho-
doxy and ·Roman C~tholicism.15 
Speculation on reunion also came from an article 
in luner i ca on 1 September 191 7. Titled, 11 New Rtrnsian 
Nationalities, 11 the writer surveyed the various ethnic 
groups in Russia likely to embrace Papal authority . The 
analysis held that Lithuanians, Poles and Ukrainians 
would be receptive to the Vatican:s direction. 1 6 More-
over, held the assessment, the Ruthenians of the Uniat 
. Church in the mcraine would benefit by SheptycJd i I s re---
lease. Th~oughout World War I, the persecution of the 
Rut,hen i ans received wide cove.rage in the American 
Catholic press. 17 In September 1917, their suffering 
was over, and they were valued assets for the Vatican's 
plan to convert the Russian Orthodox. 
In ccnclusion, the Amerj_can Catholic press examin-
ed the consequences for religion in Russia from the 
March revolution and rendered~~ optimistic verdict. 
ll 
Appraisals on the condition of the Orthodox Church were 
scund and i.nsightful. Likewise assessme~ts on the pros-
pects for expanding Catholicism were also realisti.c. 
As a.n ·erudite scholar on Eastern Orthodoxy, Rev·. Palmier .i. 
provided e x cellent and informed commentary for tbe 
Arner:Lcan Catholic press. 
In November 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized 
p ower, an article in America called the act a usurpa-
tion of authority. The appraisal depicted the Bolsheviks 
as radical revolutionaries who would not last in power. 
Their action, however, placed religious liberty in a 
precarious state, noted the commentary. Conclusively, 
though, the article noted that collapse of the Bolshevik 
government seemed certain.18 
. As far as the second revolution in 1917, most 
observers in the American press, both secular and 
Catholic, withheld their cammentary until a more stable 
picture of civil order emerged in Russia. Since vir-
tually no one predicted the possibility of a Bolshevik 
revolution in 1917, there was little to report 
probable consequences for religious freedom in 




constitution, did the American press report the sub-
stance of the Bolsheviks' policy on religion. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION OF 1917 
The American press' coverage of religious con-
ditions under the Bolsheviks from November 1917 to 
November 1921 was sporadic. News from Russia was dif-
ficult to obtain, and an influential source, the grow-
ing Russian ~migr~ community in Riga and Warsaw, main-
tained little objectivity about the Bolsheviks . The 
~migr~s' stories of persecution were usually discarded 
by American editors as too graphic. Further complica-
tions on gathering information came from the lack of 
American journalists in Petrograd. This absence existed 
because many foreign correspondents left Petrograd after 
the Bolsheviks signed a peace treaty with the Germans at 
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. Most American journalists 
departed simply because their assignments were as war 
correspondents, and Russia was no longer among the Allies 
after March 1918. Not until the American/Soviet negotia-
tions for a famine relief program in 1921 did Lenin's 
government permit a dozen American journalists to enter 
the Soviet Union.19 
The lack of experienced reporters left the en-
suing difficulties between the Bolsheviks and religious 
institutions largely unassessed in the American secular 
12 
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press. Even Frazier Hunt, writing for the Chica9..2. 
Tribune, who remained in Petrograd until 23 March 1919, 
failed to report the Bolshevi](s' policy en rel.iqion. 
Most of the com~entary in the American press did note, 
however, that the official decrees and th1?. F2brua.ry 
1918 Constitution affected primarily the Russian 
Orthodox Church. What the Bolshevik dec r ees meant for 
Catholics, Jews and Moslems rarely surfaced in the 
American secular press. 
On 2 March 1918, the Literary Digest published 
an article which bemoaned the absence of reliable news 
on the growing confrontation between the Bolsheviks and 
the Orthodox clergy. Its commentary noted that the 
Russi an Patria r ch Tikhon r farmer head of the R~rns ia.n 
Church in America, opposed Lenin's decrees on religion. 
The article als o reported from the Roches t er Pos t.- Ex pres..-'?.. 
newspaper that the Orthodox Church refused the sacraments 
to Bolshevik government officials. Furthermo re , th(~ 
Literary Digest article recounted the parallel of anti-
clericalism between the French revolution of 1789 and 
the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 which wa s noted in the 
San Antonio Light newspaper. Finally, the article 
carried an assessment offered by the Philadelphia 
Inquirer newspaper that the Bolsheviks were "oppressive 
and unjust" and that Lenin's government was "fatally 
impolitic" against the Orthodox Church.20 
Additional appraisal on the obscure transforma-
tion of religion in Russia came from Dr. William T. 
Ellis reporting from Petrograd in April 1918. He 
wrote articles for the Boston Transcript newspaper. 
The Literary Digest reprinted many of his articles in 
its own national edition. Ellis characterized the 
Bolsheviks as secularized Russian Jews who were unable 
to abate anti-Semitism caused by the speculation on 
food in Petrograd. He likewise portrayed the Orthodox 
clergy in an unflattering manner when he depicted the 
hierarchy as 11 ec9lesiastics rather than Prophets. 11 
Ellis reproached them for remaining silent on the 
social struggle. Conclusively, he saw a polarization 
of Church and State power. His summation was that: 
There exists a fundamental antagonism between 
Bolshevism and ecclesiasticism. Eminent leaders 
14 
of the (Russian Orthodox) Church are utterly 
opposed to the new political leaders, and the 
sentiment is heartily reciprocated. There is no 
cooperation for a common social or national goa1. 21 
This antagonism became a state sponsored terror 
against the Orthodox Church. The American secular press 
offered few details on the nature of the persecution. 
In a letter dated 10 April 1919, Robert Crozier Long 
writing for the New York Evening Post cited the failure 
of the Orthodox Church to aid the peasants to get land. 
The hierarchy including many leading bishops, he claimed, 
gave no direction, and many of its members were charged 
as counterrevolutionaries by the Bolsheviks~22 
Further commentary in the American secular press 
noted the West's failure to raise moral objec tions to 
the Bolsheviks persecution a cts that were known . On 
13 December 1919, the Literary Digest carried a report 
from the London Times newspaper written by Paul Dukes 
(1889-1967) a long- time resident of Petrograd. His 
a r ticle titled, " Going to Church in Russia, 11 t old 
that the Bolshevik press ridiculed religious worship 
as a superstitious practice. Despite the flagrant 
anti--religious campaign in the Bolshevik press, Dukes 
noted that the Petrograd churches on Easter Sunday in 
1919 overflowed with worshipers. The popul a ce, t hough 
deprived of a vital Orthodox leade 1:-ship, clung to their 
faith, ascertained Dukes.23 
By 1920, the American secular press no t ed that the 
Bolshevik terror against the Orthodox clergy had its 
~ffects. An article titled ''Bolshevism Out to Abolish 
7 God," from :the Literary Digest on 17 Janua..cy 1920, re-
ported that Bolshevik demands for the end of the v erwra-
tion of relics was partially successful. Many saints' 
remains were examined and exposed as merely animal bone s. 
Religious icons, after scientific examination disproved 
their authenticity, were destroyed. The Bolsheviks 
further converted larg-e Orthodox churches into museums 
with anti-religious exhibits, thus hoping to sway the 
masses away from the clergy's influence.24 
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Overall, the American secular press characterized 
the Orthodox Church as an institution in turmoil. The 
clergy were the victims of the state sponsored persecu-
tion. Charges of counterrevolutionary activity were 
brought against the h~erarchy. Its members were serious-
ly divided over the social struggle from the Bolshevik 
revolution. Conclusively, however, the American secular 
press claimed that despite the terror and subjugation of 
the Orthodox Church, the peasant masses retained their 
faith. 25 
The American Protestant periodical, the Missionary 
Review of the World, had little difficulty in accusing 
the Bolsheviks of persecution. The commentary offered 
noted that the social struggle was too vehement to allow 
for a Church/State dialogue. Conclusively, this period-
ical held that the Russian civil war would have to end 
before the Bolsheviks and the Orthodox clergy could 
create a modus yivendi. 26 
Furthermore, the Missionary Review of the World 
noted that few who opposed the Bolsheviks could escape 
the charge of being a counterrevolutionary. The hier-
archy clearly opposed the confiscation of Church property 
and the abolishment of the clergy's stipends. Although 
some clergy reportedly offered compromise, most com-
plained of the systematic destruction of churches and 
the suppression of the religious press. 27 
17 
The American Catholic press characterized the 
Bolshevik revolution in terms of both alarm and satis-
faction. These divergent assessments occurred as 
Catholic commentators were repelled at the violence 
done to the Orthodox Church, yet saw in this persecu-
tion an opportunity to expand Catholicism in Russia. 
The destruction of the former state church left a void, 
a void that the Vatican wished to fill by promoting the 
cause of reunion with the Orthodox. The first article 
in the American Catholic press on Lenin's constitution 
and its significance for religion in the Bolshevik con-
trolled areas appeared in America an 16 February 1918. 
The divergent assessments, alarm and satisfaction were 
evident in the commentary. 
The article noted that, although Lenin proclaimed 
separation of Church and State, this act affected the 
Orthodox Church. Furthermore, eventhough ecclesiastical 
property was nationalized, religious societies, reported 
the article, continued tb use church property for ser-
vices with the government's permission. Charitable 
orders continued theii work under the Commissioners of 
Public Charities. Salaries from the government, however, 
18 
would end for all clergy on 1 March 1918. The article 
depicted these acts as a blow to the Orthodox, but acts 
mainly of economic necessity.28 
By June 1918, another article published in 
America reported on the calls for Allied intervention 
in the Russian civil war. The periodical's position 
was that of the Vatican's, strict neutrality by the 
Catholic Church. The only interest for Catholics was 
the revolt of the Czech troops along the Siberian rail-
way. The periodical supported the safe passage from 
Russia for these Catholic Czech troops.29 
Greater alarm appeared in September 1918 in an 
article in America which concluded that the Bolsheviks 
were merely German agents. The basis for this claim 
arose when the Committee of Public Information received 
from its representative in Russia, Edgar Sisson, copies 
of secret documents outlining Germany's support for the 
Bolshevik cause. The commentary assessed that Lenin and 
Trotsky were German agents, that the Bolshevik revolu-
tion was financed by Germany, and that the Brest-Litovsk 
treaty betrayed the Russian people. Conclusively, the 
article contended that the Bolsheviks were not a Russian 
government but a German surrogate.30 
Further bleak predictions from the American 
Catholic press came in another America article on 7 
September 1918. James Keeley, another representative 
19 
of the Committee on Public Information reported the 
disastrous economic conditions in Russia. He predicted 
that the winter of 1918/1919 would make Russia "the 
world's most awful graveyard. 11 _31 Moreover, as disaster 
loomed, the masses turned toward religion to assuage 
their grief. In this instance, the article noted 
Robert Crozier Long's appraisal from the New York 
Evening Post that the religious revival the Bolsheviks 
equated with nationalism. The Catholic Church favored 
strengthening this national sentiment among the Lithuan-
ians, Poles and Ukrainians. These groups became recep-
tive to Rome's authority which the Bolsheviks distrusted m 
The very next month, October 1918, America pub-
lished an article depicting the successful expansion of 
Catholicism in Russia despite the turmoils there. The 
commentary noted that: 
The Holy Father has appointed bishops for the six 
dioces~s which the Czar suppressed. The Titular 
(bishop) of the new see of Minsk was recently con-
secrated at Warsaw and another bishopric will be 
founded in Siberia. The Ruthenians are reported to 
be returning in throngs to the Church, and number-
less Russians of all classes are becoming converts. 
So, not withstanding the destitution brought upon 
them by the suppr~ssion of endowments, the Catholic 
clergy are full of confidence and enthusiasm. The 
Soviets' attitude toward religious authorities is 
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said to be "consistently a.nd irreproachably correct, 11 
a slightly preferential treatwent indeed being shown 
the Catholic Church per11aps because the Orthodox 
clergy are 2uspected of holding react ionar y opi~ions. 
Corpus Christi, it is report ed , was publ icly cele-
brate d this year in Petrograd with great s p lendor.32 
Th i s article's assessment occurred along with 
.n-?ports c,f the Vatican I s iEtercession on b e h ;:.1. lf of the 
Romanov family. In August 1318, Pep e Benedi ct XV tele-
graphed bis NGncio in Warsaw, Achille Ratt~ (1857-1939) 
wh o later became Pope Pius XI (reig·l1 1922--1939), in :::,rder 
to request inforrnat i.on on the whereabouts of the~ fo rme r 
Tsarina Alexandra and her four daughters, Olga, Tatiana, 
Marie and Anastasia. 
The Po)e believed that they made various appeals 
for t heir release after the execution of the former Tsar, 
Nicholas II. Historians are uncertain cts to whether the 
enti~e fami ly perishe' by firing squad, or wl.ether 
Nicbolas II and his son wen=:::: tried o.nd executed Sc.:parateJ.y. 
Bene cl .1 c t X '✓ be U . e ·.ie d at. the t, i me t hr1 t t h r:.: for rnE:r Tsar i. n a 
a nd ~er d aughters were alive ~nd held ho s t Eg e ior a I)OS-
s .i. b1 (~ E.xc 110.n~~ 2 for \-;e rman Commun :i. s ts :L rnpr i. s c n cd } y ·:.:1 ... 8 
Kaiser in Early 1913. 
An artic le appea:ted. ::..rr. August l 9i 8 in tJ:-1 e -~~~'~--Y~"Jr-1~ 
T.iI.t~~:..§.. t i t 1 E~ c1 i ' Pope W i 11 Ai. d Porn a no f f s o 11 3 3 The p 1 ,~ a e :x ·-· 
p :cessed was s imp.lei thE:: Pope a.sJ~:ed the 3oviet g·ovecnment 
to ~elea3e the ex-Tsar1~a a~d her f a mi y, ·a nd allow them 
to l0ave Russi a. The Soviets answered ~he Pope's initial 
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request hurriedly but politely. Lenin himself had the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry telegraph the Vatican tbat he 
was unable to release the former Tsar's family because 
he lacked adequate communication with the forces holding 
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them. The last article on the matter appeared in 
October. A report titled, "Reds Evasive To Pope," stated 
that news of a mob setting fire to the house where the 
royal family resided could not be confirmed or denied. 
In fact Lenin's government claimed no kno~ledge of even 
the whereabouts of their prisoners.35 
The outcome of this entire exchange was portrayed 
as a public relations disaster for the Soviets in the 
American secular press. The American Catholic press 
failed to comment on the Pope's effort. In their last 
communication to Benedict XV, the Soviets were rude and 
uncooperative, hardly the image revealed in America's 
judgement on the Soviets. The Pope appeared as a magnan-
imous ruler nonetheless in the American secular press as 
he offered asylum to his former political and religious 
1 antagonists. No doubt this good will gesture pleased the 
growing numbers of Russian ~migr~s in Europe too. Berlin, 
Paris and Warsaw contained many exiles who vociferously 
called for the West to overthrow Lenin's government. 
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This encounter demonstrated the Vatican's initial 
desire to contact the Soviets. Further political develop-
ments from the November 1917 revolution required greater 
Soviet/Vatican contact and communication. On 20 April 
1919, Edward van der Ropp was imprisoned by the Soviets. 
As the Arcgbishop of Mogilev since November 1917, he was 
the ecclesiastical head for the Roman Catholic Church in 
Russia. Lenin's government charged him with collabora-
tion with the Polish government. His arrest coincided 
with General Joseph Pilsudski's invasioh of the Soviet 
Union in order to wrest control of disputed Belorussian 
and Ukrainian territory. After mass demonstrations in 
Petrograd, the Soviets released Ropp who went into exile 
at Warsaw. 
That the American press carried none of this in-
formation while it occurred is disquieting. The Vatican's 
unofficial newspaper, Osservatore Romano, carried Ropp's 
case, but the American journalists in Rome failed to 
cable their home offices. Even the veteran Vatican re-
porter, Thomas Morgan (1900-lg54) remained silent. 
Overall, the Vatican's silence on the religious 
difficulties in Russia was Benedict XV's policy. He 
hesitated to speak forcefully against the persecutions 
of the Orthodox Church, because of the fluid situation 
of Russian politics, and because of his concerns that 
the re mi ght be reprisals against Roman Catholics in 
Sovj_ et held arE~as. Thr2 onl.y ::1rticJ. .e i!1 the American 
secular 1:).ress to print th~ P,'Jpe ~ s concern cam1::: in thi::! 
New · Yo .. Jc 'l1i mes. I t pub i i shed an n rt i c 1 e t i t l E: d , .r P,. s s l~ ·:~--:, 
· pc,pe Warned cf Bolshevist. Da.ng·er,a which rE~ported.ly 
c2me in a. private cons.isto.ry of ca.rdinals.36 This mild 
rebuke took aim mostly at the rise of socialism in Italy 
with the Communist movement in EuropP Inf~ritic:n.e:d ct::: just 
one of the dangerous political challenges to the Church's 
By 1920 and 1921, the American Catholic preBs 
offered only positive assessments for Catholic prcspects 
i -y1 the Soviet Tfaion ., An article in ZUJ.l~~t) ~-?- on 20 .AiJ.gust 
1921, reflected the optimistic view. 'Yb.e comment.a ry 
noted a re l ig ~ous void in Russia since the Soviet des-
tru.ction of much of the Orthodox hie .ra _t~ch_y. In tb:~s 
voi d , epecul~ted the article , the m~sses might turn to 
the leadership of the Catholic Church. The two strong 
fiCclenia.stic.::i, Archbishop Sheptycki :i and Archbishop Ropp 
WA re quote<~ as believing that reunion had a ch?,r;.ce in 
J 9-21 . The only minor complication noted was the ques-
tion of which rite to use to attract Russian converts, 
the Latin ri.t~-= or the~ Eastern rite. 37 
In cO'rJ.clusion, the American Catholj. c press por-
trayed the Vatican as willing to contact and n2gotiate 
on a limited basis with ·the Soviets. ·rhe excesses of 
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religious persecution against the Orthodox were viewed 
as tragic, but it was an area where the Catholic Church 
could do little to intercede other than by lower diplo-
matic contacts. Thus, from 1917 to 1921, the American 
Catholic press depicted Catholics in Russia as unscathed 
by the fury unleashed against the Orthodox Church. 
It was significant that the American Catholic press 
also noted that large numbers of Poles left Russia during 
these years, thus removing millions of Catholics from 
Soviet dominated territory. The Baltic states also re-
ceived their independence, thus further diminshing the 
numbers of the faithful under Petrograd's control. It 
was never mentioned directly in the American press, but 
the remaining Catholics in the Volga region, Siberia and 
the ancient Armenian Catholic Church in the Caucasus 
were too widely scattered or unorganized to offer much 
difficulty to Soviet authority. They we~e portrayed 
rather as groups of great potential for spreading the 
faith. 
The Vatican seemed prepared, by all accounts in the 
American Catholic press in late 1921, to recognize the 
Soviets. They were the victors in the Russian civil war, 
and had signed a treaty with Poland. Thus, when the 
European Allied powers called for an economic conference 
at Genoa in the spring of 1922, the American Catholic 
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press gave increasing commentary that a modus vivendi 
between the Vatican and the Soviet Union was a distinct 
possibility. These predictions were sound, judging 
from t h e knowledge that the Soviet/Vatican negotiations 
over a Catholic famine relief mission were progressing. 
The American Catholic press, however, failed to assess 
the Soviet desire to erase all religion from the state. 
CHAPTER III 
THE GENOA CONFERENCE, 1922 
The Genoa Conference occurred primarily for 
economic reasons. Europe remained seriously disabled 
from World War I. The Allied powers, especially 
England and France, were eager to remedy the chaotic 
market conditions and reestablish a stable currency 
exchange system. There were two important events 
which took place during the formal discussions. 
First, the Soviet Union made its debut as a member of 
the European community when Lenin's government, the 
victor in Russia's civil war, accepted an invitation 
to send a delegation. Secondly, the Weimar government 
in Germany and the Soviets concluded diplomatic rela-
tions at Rapallo thus uniting the two outcast nations 
of Europe. 
From the viewpoint of the English and the French 
governments, the alliance proved unsettling. They came 
to Genoa to press the Soviets for payment of the Tsarist 
World War I debts and for some form of restitution on 
the nationali zed property confiscated by Lenin's govern-
ment. The pact proved further disquieting to the 
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Allies because the Germans and the Soviets put aside 
I 
their claims against each other. This agreement was 
not the precedent the English and the French desired. 
In the American secular press, the business com-
munity supported the plans of the English and the 
French. Many industrial and financial concerns de-
sired to establish plans for Allied payment of war 
debts and restitution for nationalized property. 
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There was, however, no campaign to sponsor an American 
delegation to represent the United States' claims. 
President Warren G. Harding (1865-1923) remained aloof 
from British entreaties to send a delegation. Thus, 
the American secular press had little to report con-
cerning the United States' involvement since no repre-
sentation was forthcoming. 
One of the most noticeable consequences of the 
Genoa Conference in the American secular press was the 
improved image of Lenin's government. Editorial opin-
ion approved of the appearance and style of the Soviet 
1 Foreign Minfster, George Chicherin (1872-1936). His 
attention to etiquette made the Bolsheviks seem part 
of the civilized West. The ruthlessness and brutality 
of the revolutionary days and the civil war became a 
part of the Soviet Union's past. The impre~sion 
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Chicherin made with his cordial tone suggested that 
the excesses of the Bolsheviks, especially their agi-
tation for world revolution, were over. As a result 
of this improved image, . many American newspapers ac-
cepted the name Soviets over Bolsheviks and the Soviet 
Union over Russia. The acknowledgment of Lenin's vic-
tory became an accepted political fact, and the ques-
tion of American recognition of the Soviets was raised 
in the secular press. 
Like the Soviets' image, the American secular 
press surveyed the Vatican's stance at Genoa. Pope 
Pius XI (1857-1939) sent a delegation with instruc-
-
tions to negotiate the legal status of the Roman 
Catholic Church in the Soviet Union. Unlike the 
Soviets' decision to send a delegation, the Pope's 
action received wide and unflattering comment in the 
American secular press. 
Accusations arose condemning the Vatican's 
goals in the Soviet Union. On 24 April 1922, an ar-
ticle publ~shed in The New York Times outlined the 
Holy See's policy toward the Soviets. The article's 
conclusion held that Pope Pius XI desired to conclude 
a concordat whereby the Vatican would recognize Lenin's 
government in exchange for unhindered religious freedom 
for Roman Catholics in the Soviet Union. Because the 
Soviet/Vatican diplomatic contacts were conducted 
secretly, The New York Times offered a speculative 
analysis concerning the Vatican's motives for a con-
cordat.38 
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The reconciliation between the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Roman Catholic Church was the primary 
goal of the Holy See, noted The New York Times' assess-
ment. The Soviets in return, for allowing Catholic and 
Orthodox free association and possible union, would 
gain prestige by having an ambassador from the Vatican 
in Moscow. Furthermore, a concordat between Moscow and 
the Holy See would alter the attitude of the entire 
Catholic body politic in Europe. France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain had large Marxist parties which vied 
with Catholic Centrist parties for control of the govern-
ment. A treaty between the Soviets and the Church, held 
The New York Times, would neutralize the influence of 
these Catholic parties. 
Altho~gh sound in its political judgements, the 
article was inaccurate concerning the Vatican's religious 
policy toward the Soviets. For example, the newspaper 
claimed that, when Pius XI was 'Archbishop of Poland', he 
suppressed the 'Greek Orthodox Church' in the Belorussian 
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and Ukrainian territories won by the Polish General, 
Joseph Pilsudski (1867-1935), in 1921. The article 
further declared that the reconciliation movement, 
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman 
Catholic Church, had momentum prior to 1917 among the 
masses but that talk of reunion was quiescent in 1921. 
As for the first assertion, there was never any 
hierarchical position as the 'Archbishop of Poland.' 
Achille Ratti's title was Papal Nuncio to Poland. He 
held the rank of an Archbishop, but the article mis-
represented his jurisdiction. As Nuncio, he restruc-
tured Poland's dioceses along territorial boundaries 
which fluctuated rapidly after the conclusion of the 
Versailles Treaty in 1919. The suppression of the 
Russian, not 'Greek', Orthodox Church in Poland's 
Belorussian and Ukrainian territories came from 
secular Polish authorities. Religious coercion was 
not part of Ratti's design. The article also failed to 
note that Ratti was no longer in Poland in 1921 when 
General Pilsudski consolidated his claim on the 
Belorussian and Ukrainian areas. 
The timing of the second assertion in The New York 
Times' article was also faulty. The year 1917 was the 
same year when many Orthodox converts freely joined the 
Roman Catholic Church in Russia especially in Petrograd. 
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Prior to 1917, Tsarist decrees made conversion a crimi-
nal act. Only briefly in 1905, did the Russian Imper-
ial government permit conversion. Approximately 200,000 
people in the Ukraine changed their registration from 
the state Russian Orthodox Church to the Uniat Church 
loyal to Rome.39 This ~eemingly liberal policy was a 
result of the 1905 revolution in Russia. When Tsar 
Nicholas II sufficiently regained control, he issued 
subsequent decrees which rescinded the free conversion 
policy. 
The most penetrating analysis of the Vatican's 
political motives offered in the American secular press 
came from the New Republic, a progressive periodical. 
The author of the article, M. Beilinson, criticized the 
Holy See as an opportunistic power. He assessed that 
the collapse of Tsarist Russia radically changed the 
political situation in Eastern Europe. The end of the 
Russian monarchy proved beneficial to the expansion of 
Catholicism which Beilinson characterized derogatorily 
1 as 11 Cathol:i,.c Imperialism." Indeed, he saw that the 
· weakened Russian Orthodox Church, the creation of a 
Polish state, the post World War I freed6m of activity 
in the Russian border states, especially in the three 
Baltic countries, and the steady decline of the Greek 
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Orthodox Church in Western Asia all represented oppor-
tunities for the Vatican.40 
Diplomatically, Beilinson recounted the benefits 
that the Vatican reaped from World War I suggesting that 
the Catholic Church gained from the conflict unwarranted 
concessions. France signed an agreement with the Holy 
See, and the Italians negotiated a concordat. The 
British had a representative at the Vatican, and the 
London government supported the Pope's interests at the 
Genoa Conference. As these negotiations between the 
Holy See and the various secular European governments 
progressed, the Vatican clarified and strengthened the 
Roman Catholic Church's legal status. 
Despite Beilinson's criticisms, he grudgingly ad-
mired the Vatican's diplomatic timing. He described 
Pope Benedict XV (reign 1914-1922) as a master of diplo-
macy who chose wisely not to compromise the Catholic 
Church during the Russian civil war by making contact 
with the various White Guard factions. The one enticing 
opportunity to expand Catholicism arose, noted Beilinson, 
when the Petliura government in the Ukraine, which existed 
briefly in 1919, sent an embassy to the Pope. Benedict XV 
responded by sending to the Ukraine a Catholic mission, 
but before it reached the country, the Bolshevik army re-
occupied the territory. The Vatican mission halted in 
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Poland and eventually returned to Rome. 
Concerning the Vatican i s intentions at Genoa, 
Beilinson believed that the rumors of negotiations for 
a concordat between the Holy See and the Kremlin were 
true. He declared that Pope Pius XI's attitude revealed 
a great deal in this matter. Beilinson noted that en 
7 April 1922, Pius XI sent an open letter to Archbishop 
Signori of Genoa wishing the conference success. Russia 
received mention in the letter. On 29 April 1922, Pope 
Pius XI sent a second letter this time to Cardinal 
Gaspar r i (1852-1934) the Vatican Secretary of State from 
1 3 October 1914 to 7 February 1930. Gasparri was the 
architect beh ind many of the Vatican's concordats, th u s 
Beilinson noted that important terms must have arisen. 
In t his second letter, however, the Pope lamented that n o 
immediate results came from Genoa. Mgr. Giuseppe Pi zzardo 
( 1877-1970) went to Genoa on the . Vatican's behalf with the 
Chu rch 1 s property claims against the Soviets, but t he 
Allies informed him that they ha d already negotiated the 
return of toreign property without results. 
Beilinson's assessment was sound because the 
Vatican and the Soviets h~d concluded an agreement a t 
Genoa. Cardinal Gasparri and the Soviet representative 
to Italy, Vaclav Vorovski (1871-1923), who was murdered 
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10 May 1923 in Lausanne, Switzerland by a counterrevolu-
tionary, concluded a pact limited to approving the Papal 
Famine Relief Mission to Russia. The Osservatore Romano, 
the Vatican's unofficial newspaper, confirmed this agree-
ment, but the document was not published until Hansjakob 
Stehle (1927- ), a West German scholar and journalist, 
printed the text in one of his appendices in his first 
German edition in 1977 in a study detailing the Eastern 
diplomacy of the Vatican. 
Although the agreement concerned only humanitarian 
aid by the Vatican, Beilinson maintained that the agree-
ment represented an entente cordiale between the Holy 
See and the Soviets. His overall appraisal on the nego-
tiations was harsh on both the Soviets and the Vatican. 
He viewed both powers as exploiters who wished to gain at 
the expense of the weakened Russian Orthodox Church. The 
very fact that Beilinson referred to the Holy See as the 
'Black International' and to the Soviets as the 'Red 
International' in the article's title revealed his distaste 
• for both powers. 
The questions, who was M. Beilinson and what were 
his or her qualifications when commenting on the Soviet/ 
Vatican struggle, have yet to be answered. Although bio-
graphical material, especially education and journalism 
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experience are unknown, the reporting of events was 
accurate in the article. Furthermore, the tone of the 
article represented a mild form of anti-Catholic senti-
ment which prevailed . in the American secular press dur-
ing the 192O's. Beilinson's conclusions on the Soviets' 
and the Holy See's motives were skeptical because the 
author did not subscribe to either's claim that they 
represented some form of ultimate religious or scientific 
truth. Thus, Beilinson presented in the article a fairly 
common theme in the American secular press, namely, that 
both powers sought a worldwide following based on exclu-
siveness. 
A defense for the Vatican's negotiating with the 
Soviets at Genoa appeared in the American Catholic press. 
The Reverend Aurelio Palmieri defined the Holy See's 
policy in an article for the Catholic World. The reasons 
for Benedict XV's and Pius XI's contacts with the Soviets, 
stated Palmieri, were numerous. He admitted to Catholic 
plans for expansion in the Soviet Union, but he charac-
terized it as "fruitful apostleship" rather than as im-
perialism. Moreover, he maintained that, when Pius XI 
took office in February 1922, the Pope wished to extend 
to the Russian Orthodox the idea of ecclesiastical unity. 
The schism between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic 
need last no longer with Tsarism gone. 41 
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Furthermore, Palmieri portrayed the Vatican's 
activities on behalf of the Orthodox Russians since the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 as sincere efforts. Indeed, 
Benedict XV acknowledged the persecution of the Russian 
Orthodox clergy, and he interceded with the Soviets on 
their behalf. He also collected funds for Russian 
emigres. Pope Pius XI continued his predecessor's work 
and expanded it. 
Pius XI continued Benedict XV's plan to send a 
relief mission to the Soviet Union as part of the inter-
national effort to end the famine. He also meant to ex-
pand the scope of the mission to include the Volga region. 
Despite these charitable works, the emigre . press in 
Europe disavowed the Vatican's rapprochement with the 
Soviets. Some Russian emigres claimed, like Beilinson, 
that Pius XI aimed to take advantage of the Soviets' per-
secution of the Orthodox Church. Specifically, the emi-
gres press accused the Vatican of seeking to extend its 
authority by sending Jesuits into Russia with food while 
7 proselytizing among the Orthodox. 
The various charges raised by the emigre PFess 
Palmieri refuted on a case by case basis. The noted 
Russian novelist and literary critic Demetrius Merezhovski 
(1865-1941) printed one of the first articles in the 
European ~migr~s press attacking the Vatican's nego-
tiations with the Soviets. In the Russian ~migr~s 
paper in Paris, Poslednie Novosti, Merezhovski noted: 
the reunion of churches has long since been the 
yearning of the prophetic spirits of Russia ... 
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The universal pastor, the one flock - this is our 
hope, our faith, our love ... but this reunion 
could not take place if the Vatican made a concor-
dat with the international gang who call themselves 
the Soviets of Russia.42 
In Berlin, the reaction of the Russian ~migr~ 
press was similar to the reaction in Paris. An article 
in Rulon 14 May 1922 stated: 
the Vatican hopes by condescension to pave the way 
to the reunion of churches. The Vatican hopes to 
quench the thirst for faith of Russian souls, but 
that thirst cannot be guenched by any agreement 
with the persecutors.43 
The Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia likewise re-
sented the Vatican's policy of reconciliation with the 
Soviets. On 1 June 1922, an article appeared in Samou-
prava, the official organ of the Serbian Church. It 
concluded: 
that by means of a treaty stipulated between the 
Holy See and the Soviets, the Pope and the Jesuits 
have conquered an unlimited right to spread Cathol-
icism ~ithin Bolshevist Russia, and to increase the 
influence of the Roman Church.44 
The article continued with the news that the 
Serbian Patriarch and his hierarchy protested what they 
saw as a Catholic invasion of Russia. They issued an 
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appeal to the Patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul). 
Their final statement claimed that the 'corrupted' West 
had no right in the East. The last article appearing in 
the European emigre press was in another Serbian paper, 
the Balkan. It charged that the ''alleged concordat be-
tween the Holy See and Bolshevism is the greatest shame 
of the twentieth century 11 .45 
Because of this religious indignation in Europe, 
which the American secular press failed to comment upon, 
Palmieri offered an analysis of the Vatican's policies 
in order to mitigate the criticisms of the Russian emi-
gres press and the Eastern Orthodox Churches. His anal-
ysis was essential for the American Catholic press since 
the Holy See looked to the Catholic Church in the United 
States to provide funding for the Papal Famine Relief 
Mission to the Soviet Union. Unclarified intentions 
might leave Pius XI's designs at the mercy of his critics. 
Palmieri began by noting that all Popes of the 
modern age followed a conservative and patient policy 
toward civil authorities. The Vatican was not unaffected 
by political changes, but the turmoils of nations would 
never change Church dogma. The hierarchical Church lived 
in close contact with secular authority, but it did not 
follow its vicissitudes. In no way, Palmieri reminded 
39 
his American audience, would the Roman Catholic Church 
depend on the political conditions of society to main-
tain its existence. 
Moreover, Palmieri noted that while the Church 
remained independent of any political regime, exigencies 
of the hour made for necessary, and at times, sporadic 
relations. Conclusively, he held that the Church cannot 
make war upon political regimes which assumed power by 
violence. The Church may condemn them, but it retained 
the right to ask of them the necessary guarantees for the 
faithful. Thus, for the Vatican to negotiate with the 
Soviets, in order to mitigate some of the persecution of 
the faithful, was within the realm of its traditional 
jurisdiction. Palmieri concluded that reports of a 
formal concordat were premature. Too many political 
observers, he wrote, wanted to find a second Rapallo 
this time at the Vatican's expense. 
Comparing Palmieri's analysis to Beilinson's and 
The New York Times', it is clear that the American secu-
lar press failed to note that, at Genoa, Pius XI contin-
ued Benedict XV's policy in regards to the Soviet Union. 
Although Pius XI appeared to chart a new policy, by dis-
missing the defunct Provisional Government's charg~ 
d'affaires to the Vatican, Nicholas Boch (died 1962), 
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Benedict XV had already decided this action. Pius XI'S 
desire to use food to win converts was also a continua-
tion of the former Pope's policy which the American 
secular press failed to report. 
Furthermore, the American secular press speculated 
that the Vatican and the Soviets, while at Genoa, were 
concluding a rapprochement because of the gains each saw 
in the famine. Reports appeared declaring that formal 
Vatican recognition of the Soviet government was imminent. 
Palmieri's lone voice in the American Catholic press 
warned that such judgments were incorrect, and that the 
Soviets' religious policy required significant Vatican 
concessions, concessions never historically granted to 
any secular government. 
Owing to the impressions on Genoa offered in the 
American secular press, many Americans were unprepared to 
grasp the Soviet perspective, or the Vatican's, when the 
show trial of the Roman Catholic clergy from Petrograd 
convened in Moscow in March 1923. As far as the American 
1 secular pr~ss was concerned, the aftermath of Genoa meant 
acceptance if not recognition of the Soviet Union by the 
Holy See. The clash of wills in the 1923 show trial 
came as a comp lete reversal of the American secular press' 
assessment on the significance of the Soviet/Vatican 
agreement at the Genoa Conference. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CATHOLIC CLERGY TRIAL, 1923 
A comparison between the American secular press' 
coverage of the March 1923 Petrograd Catholic clergy 
trial and the American Catholic press' coverage reveals 
both similarities and differences. The consensus sup-
ported overwhelmingly by both institutions suggested 
that the Soviets aimed to persecute first the small 
Russian Roman Catholic Church, and then attack the 
larger Orthodox Church. A few voices, however, in the 
American secular press, dissented. They examined the 
Soviets' policy to make the Catholic clergy conform to 
civil decrees, and they saw no undue persecution. 
Their conclusions favored the sovereignty of Lenin's 
government against the prerogatives of the Roman Church. 
Whatever side one supported, Soviet or the Catholic 
Church, the accuracy of trial reports and subsequent 
coverage on worldwide reaction was sound in the American 
press. Both the secular and Catholic press printed eye-
witness accounts of the five day trial conducted from 
21 March to 26. Both also followed international reac-
tion and reported it accurately. From the tone and 




Of the seven events characterizing the Soviet/ 
Vatican struggle in the American press, this trial held 
the most significance. When the Soviets issued the 
death sentence against some of the clergy, and when they 
executed Monsignor Constantine Budkiewicz (1867-1923) a 
canon at Saint Catherine's in Petrograd, the focus in 
the American press assessed the Soviets' religious 
policy more closely than when the Soviets were persecut-
ing the Orthodox Church. Underlying tensions were 
reviewd, revealing a besieged Russian Roman Catholic 
Church. No longer, as in 1921, did any writer suggest 
in the American press that the Catholic Church was 
relatively safe from the Soviets' drive against organ-
ized religion. 
One of the unique consequences in American reac-
tion was the strengthening of ecumenism. Protestant 
and Jewish leaders joined in common cause with the 
Roman Catholic Church because they too shared the legacy 
of Soviet persecution. Indeed, the unity against the 
, Communist movement crystalized in virtually every 
American church. Also, due in part to this professed 
antagonism, the American r~ligious community helped delay 
the United St a tes' recognition of the Soviet Union by ten 
years. While Catholic European countries recognized the 
Soviets, American politicians adhered to the views of 
the religious community and withheld recognition. 
Thus, the trial had a negative impact on American/ 
Soviet relations owing in large part to the reaction 
of the churches. 
In the American secular press, the trial _pro-
ceedings appeared in several eyewitness accounts. 
Francis McCullagh (1874-19~6), a journalist for the 
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New York Herald, published his account on 6 April 1923 
which many American newspapers carried. As an Irish-
Roman Catholic, who served in Russia during the Allied 
intervention as a British officer, and who was a prisoner 
of Bolshevik forces in Siberia in 1920, McCullagh excor-
iated the Soviets for conducting the trial. He consid-
ered the proceedings sacrilegious and a case of religious 
persecution. He correctly blamed Gregory Zinoviev (1883-
1936) as the man behind the trial. 
Zinoviev was the Party chairman in Petrograd, and 
he wanted the reluctant Catholic Church to conform with 
the Soviet decrees on religion. Mccullagh berated his 
forcefulness as well as the behavior of the three Soviet 
judges and the public prosecutor, Nicholas Krylenko 
(188501938). Despite his ipparent outrage, Mccullagh 
reported the trial accurately and cited articles in 
Izvestia and Pravda and compared them with trial testi-
many. He lost his status as a journalist after the trial, 
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however, because of the Soviet threat to deport all 
American reporters if his credentials were not revoked. 
Another eyewitness account in the American secu-
lar press came from the news service of the National 
Catholic Welfare Council on 21 May 1923. Reverend 
Edmund Walsh (1885-1956), the American Jesuit priest 
selected by Pope Pius XI to head the Papal famine relief 
mission to the Soviet Union, wrote the report. Along 
with Mccullagh, Walsh, as the Papal representative, sat 
in the court room from the trial's first day to its 
close. His account appeared in the New York Times on 
27 May 1923. 46 Like McCullagh's account, Walsh also 
ridiculed Krylenko's style, claiming he was 'blood-
thirsty' and 'inhuman.' These two accounts supported 
a survey of American newspaper editorials which revealed 
that the show trial failed to win sympathy for the 
Soviets. The trial was portrayed as an attack on re -
ligious freedom and not as a demonstration of the 
Soviets' sovereign right to regulate religious bodies 
in accordance with civil law. 
Two newspapers with a substantial circulation, 
the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune, had foreign 
correspondents in Moscow during the trial. Walter 
Duranty (1884-1957), a noted English journalist and 
World War I correspondent, served as the New York Times' 
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reporter in the Soviet Union. His initial reports 
underestimated the impact the trial would create. 
Duranty, an admirer of the Communist movement, believed 
at the beginning of the trial that the Soviets would be 
lenient and would not issue any death sentences.47 He 
reported that only 150 people attended the court's 
first session; thus, the proceedi~g was likely to prove 
routine. The execution of Mgr. Budkiewicz and the mount-
ing world reaction, however, changed Duranty's sporadic 
coverage. Overall, the New York Times published five 
editorials on the trial, each favoring the Petrograd 
clergy. 
George Seldes (1890- ), an American citizen 
with Russian parents, was a foreign correspondent for 
the Chicago Tribune. Unlike Duranty, Seldes felt that 
the p6litical ramifications from the trial would be 
significant. He cabled articles from 22 March to 4 
April 1923 on the trial. Seldes succeeded in conducting 
the only published interview with Edmund Walsh. The 
American priest reminded Seldes that the generous 
famine relief collections from Catholic Americans, 
totaling more than four million dollars, would likely 
end if the Soviets executed any of the Petrograd clergy.48 
Both these journalists took a personal interest 
in the trial and conferred with Soviet officials and 
foreign ambassadors. Seldes offered a solution to 
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free the clergy by exchanging them for Communists held 
in Italian jails.49 Likewise, Duranty had made a pro-
posal to the German ambassador in Moscow to free the 
clergy, once the death sentences were issued against 
Archbishop Cieplak and Mgr. Budkiewicz, but similar to 
Seldes' plan it too failed.SO 
The San Francisco Chronicle published articles 
on the trial from 23 March to 7 April 1923. Reports 
in this newspaper stated that Archbishop Cieplak's 
testimony revealed that Pope Pius XI would allow the 
Petrograd clergy to sign an agreement with the Soviet 
government regarding the utilization of church buildings 
and other properties. 51 The paper reported that 
Krylenko dismissed the Vatican's compromise because 
what the Soviets considered important was not last 
minute compromise but obedience to Soviet law. The 
theme stressed was that the American sense of justice 
was opposite the Soviet sense of justice. 
Krylenko's statement on why the Soviets acted in 
this fashion appeared only in the Soviet press. The 
San Francisco Chronicle concentrated rather on Krylenko's 
temper and verbal abuse of the clergy which was all part 
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of a show trial. Many American newspapers also failed 
to comprehend the Soviet theatrics, and the three 
editorials published by the San Francisco Chronicle 
on the trial depicted the Soviets in the lowest terms. 
The outcry in this newspaper was not that unusual since 
the city of San Francisco supported various Russian 
refugee groups all united in their stand against the 
Soviet government. 
Despite the overwhelming support for the Petrograd 
clergy in most secular American newspapers, editorials 
favoring the Soviets appeared. The St. Louis Post-
Dispatch published five editorials on the trial, three 
of which were highly favorable of the Soviets. These 
three editorials also criticized the Petrograd clergy 
which was atypical, but significantly the criticism 
came before the announcement of Mgr. Budkiewicz's execu-
tion on 4 April 1923. 
One of the editorials favoring the Soviets dis-
counted the belief that the priests were tried because 
of their status as clergymen. The writer suggested that 
rather they were guilty of treason since they admitted 
to having communications with Polish authorities during 
the Polish/Soviet war of 1919-1921. Furthermore, since 
the clergy all held Sovi~t citizenship, the writer noted 
. . 1 1 52 that they must obey the c1v1 aws. 
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Another editorial appeared in the Post-Dispatch 
which condemned the habits and privileges of Russian 
clergymen. The writer identified himself as a former 
Russian citizen. The editorial content, however, was 
flawed and misleading. The writer claimed that the 
Petrograd clergy deserved their sentences because of 
their past injustices against the Russian people. These 
clergymen, the writer held, were guilty of supporting 
race riots against the Hebrews. While it was true that 
the Jews suffered in the pogroms, the actual persecutors 
were the Tsars and the Orthodox Church. The writer 
failed to note that the Roman Catholic clergy never held 
a leading role in Russian society.53 
The writer further claimed that the Petrograd 
clergy owned too many valuable tracts of land. Concern-
ing the Catholic estates, however, the writer failed to 
note that the Tsars confiscated most of these properties 
during the nineteenth century. Finally, the writer 
accused the priests of trying to overthrow the Soviet 
government . by inciting the masses. The writer of this 
editorial confused the highly visible Orthodox clergy 
with the small and insignificant Roman Catholic clergy 
in Russia. No distinction appeared between the two in 
the writer's analysis. The editorial opinion did not 
correspond to the condition or the role of the Catholic 
Church in Russia since the November 1917 revolution. 
A more concise defense for the Soviets appeared 
in the Post-Dispatch on 4 April 1923 on page eighteen. 
The writer of this editorial urged that the policy of 
self-determination be given a chance in the Soviet 
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Union. He noted that President Wilson's fourteen points 
provided for self-determination, and the writer saw no 
reason, not even the trial, to change American policy. 
As far as the trial went, the writer believed that the 
Soviets were justified in trying the priests especially 
since both leading clergymen, Archbishop Cieplak and 
Mgr. Budkiewicz, were Soviet citizens. The writer sur-
mised that they knowingly and willingly disregarded 
Soviet decrees because they were inconsistent with the 
Church's canon law. Hence, their trial and sentences 
were based on their defiance of the civil law. The 
writer summarized his view of the Soviets by concluding: 
Unless you are ready to say that Russia has not the 
right to govern herself, and that she should allow 
the rest of the world to pass on her laws, then I 
can't see any justification for official interfer-
ence in the clerical cases. We know that the 
Russians disapprove of our government, but we 
certainly don't intend to change it on that account, 
do we? Then why should we expect Russia to change 
hers on our account?54 
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Most commentary in the American secular press 
favored the clergymen, and many writers noted the 
unusual unity of faiths against the Soviets' show 
trial system. After the March trial of the Petrograd 
. 
clergy, Zinoviev ordered the former Patriarch, 
Tikhon of the Orthodox Church, to stand trial that 
April. The existence of religious institutions in 
the Soviet Union appeared doomed unless clergymen 
conformed to the government's secular decrees. The 
1918 Soviet constitution granting separation of 
Church and State and the freedom of religious worship 
appeared meaningless i.n the American press. What 
the American press overwhelmingly described during 
these show trials was a direct attack on religious 
organizations.55 
What characterized this assault, noted many 
commentators, was the Soviet desire to end the in-
fluence of religion. The government banned Soviet 
officials from attending church functions. Those 
workers who identified themselves as believers be-
came second class citizens. They were discriminated 
against in employment, housing and schooling. Food 
rationing in Soviet cities, moreover, went according 
to who was an atheist and who was not. 56 
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There was some resistance within Russia to the 
Soviets' persecutions and trials, but their was little 
unity of the faiths as there was in America. The 
Orthodox Church was divided, some clergymen wanted their 
former leader Tikhon to acquiesce to Soviet demands, 
some wanted him defrocked, and some called for further 
resistance. Similarly, the Russian Catholics lacked 
leadership. Archbishop Ropp was in exile in Poland, 
Archbishop Cieplak was in a Moscow jail, and all the 
Catholic episcopal sees in Russia by the end of 1923 
lacked a bishop due to their exile or imprisonment. 
Russian Protestant churches, however, such as the 
Methodists and Quakers had already signed agreements 
with the Soviets. Russian Jews likewise wanted little 
publicity and tried to accommodate themselves with the 
Soviet decrees.57 
The most thorough analysis of the Soviet designs 
against religion came from Louis Fischer (1896-1970) an 
American journalist sympathetic to the Communist move-
ment. He found the unity of faiths in America hypocri-
tical. Anti-Semitism was part of the Roman Catholic 
Church's unofficial credo, noted Fischer. The Eastern 
Orthodox ~migr~s clergy likewise were against Jews be-
cause they believed that many Soviets were ethnic Jews 
intent on destroying the Orthodox Church. 
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What Fischer tried to demonstrate in his assess-
ment was that the Soviet show trial system, although 
flawed by Western standards, was a means of social 
struggle. The Soviets wanted to end the dominance of 
the hierarchy of all churches in their state. They 
selected the Catholics first for a trial because they 
were a small group, and because they were most adamant 
in their opposition to the Soviet system. The Soviets 
failed to assess, noted Fischer, that the Catholic clergy 
had a worldwide following that would support its struggle. 
The more significant objective Fischer noted in the 
Soviet persecution of religion was the destruction of 
the Orthodox Church. In this case, the Soviets wanted 
to lead the masses away from the church, thus furthering 
the class struggle and eventually equalizing all citizens. 
Fischer summarized that the Soviets failed to ascertain 
worldwide reaction to their designs in the show trials of 
1923. 58 
Unlike Fischer's apologia, the American Catholic 
press excoriated the Soviets' show trial of the Petrograd 
clergy. Citing the Soviet constitution of 1918 granting 
religious freedom, an article in the Catholic World in 
April 1923 lambasted the Soviet claims of religious 
tolerance. 59 Furthermore, after the execution of Mgr. 
Budkiewicz, the Catholic press recounted what it saw as 
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the martyrdom of the Catholic clergy since the November 
1917 revolution. After misleading articles expressing 
only the best of hopes for the expansion of Catholicism 
in the Soviet Union, the terrible truth was published. 
Russia lacked a Catholic hierarchy. The Soviets had 
deliberately exiled, imprisoned or murdered Catholic 
clergymen for their refusal to surrender church property. 
Catholic churches were closed by government decree. 
Divine worship was all but impossible; large groups at 
mass were prohibited. Perhaps the final insult was 
that the Vatican's relief efforts during the famine 
failed to mitigate the persecution against Catholics. 
The Roman Catholic Church in Russia was disintegrating.60 
It was the execution of Mgr. Budkiewicz that 
created a dramatic increase in denouncing the Soviets 
in the Catholic press. The execution was depicted as 
an act of religious persecution in an article in America 
on 14 April 1923. The periodical published Article VII 
of the Treaty of Riga from 1921 which supposedly granted 
the Roman Catholic Church its legal status in the Soviet 
Union. The commentary suggested that the execution 
violated this treaty. Moreover, the commentary speculated 
that possible responses might include some Polish military 
action since the treaty was also the peace accord between 
Poland and the Soviet Union. 61 
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The Catholic press was also eager to report how 
the Protestant churches supported the Petrograd clergy. 
Quoting from the Methodist periodical, Christian 
Advocate, from its 12 April 1923 issue, an article in 
America approved the commentary: 
It is not for any Protestant to lessen the glory 
of these martyrs by saying that they were obedient 
to "Rome" rather than to God. They have been bred 
in the belief that the voice that speaks to them 
through the Church is the voice of God. And in their 
defiance of that Soviet law which offends the dic-
tates of conscience they have displayed a heroism 
that links them with all who through the ages have 
said: "We know that we ought to obey God rather 
than man. " 6 2 
Despite this approval of Christian unity, grave 
inaccuracies existed in the Catholic press' analysis of 
the Soviet system. Charges of a Jewish conspiracy were 
printed in America. It assessed that: 
The Jewish element is trying to gain complete 
ascendency in the councils of State. It is assert~d 
that in the event of Lenin's death, Russia will be 
ruled by a group of five men. Form this group the 
candidates are Trotzky, Kameneff and Stalin, all Jews 
and mentioned as certain to have a place, and Zinoviev, 
a Jew, Rykoff, Dzherzhinsky and Krassin.6 3 : 
These latent anti-Semitic accusations were typical of the 
Catholic C.hurch's unofficial view on the political struc,... 
ture of the Soviet Union. The American Catholic press 
also tried to mitigate some of the accusations by de-
nouncing anti-Semitic riots in Poland resulting from the 
trial. The Vatican understood that many of these ethnic 
revolutionary Jews were secularized, yet the Church failed 
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to convince many of its members in Eastern Europe that 
equating Communism with the Jewish religion was a dis-
tortion. The American Catholic ~ress, then, was less 
susceptible to making charges of an anti-Semitic 
character, yet the European Catholic press was often 
less tactful. 
Overall, there were two consequences in the 
American Catholic community resulting from the trial. 
First, its eighteen million members in 1923 would not 
support politicians who suggested that the United States 
recognize the Soviet government. Second, the American 
Catholic Church emerged from its isolation. Dialogues 
be tween American bishops in both Catholic and Protestant 
churches trace their beginnings on unity talks to this 
period. Furthermore, social and charitable Catholic 
organizations fraternized with Protestant counterparts . 
Although anti-Catholicism was strong throughout the 
1920's, the trial created a common cause and a common 
enemy for Catholics and Protestants. Thus, at least 
at the hierarchical levels, ecumenism gained momentum 
due to the Soviet persecution of religion. 
CHAPTER V 
THE · FAMINE RELIEF MISSION OF 1921-1924 
The American press reported accurately on the 
Papal relief mission in the Soviet Union between 1921 
and 1924 for several reasons. First, the mission was 
connected to the larger American Relief Administration 
directed by the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover 
(1874-1964). This relief organization had its own 
public relations and publicity staff which encouraged 
American donations. Moreover, Lenin's government 
allowed freedom of communication and transport for 
American journalists reporting on famine conditions. 
Finally, the head of the Papal mission was from 
Georgetown University, the Reverend Edmund Walsh. He 
kept in close touch with American correspondents and 
often made appeals to the press when the Soviets hinder-
ed his program. 
Coverage of the famine reached its peak from 
1921 to 1923 in the American secular press. The Nation 
published six articles during this time. Likewise, the 
New Republic printed five articles. Overall, their 
assessments reported the success of the entire relief 
effort. Millions were reportedly saved. The only un-
certainty was how would the Soviet agricultural policy 
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rebuild the nation. The famine was analyzed in the 
American secular press as a product of civil war and 
drought. Lenin had shelved the proposed collectiviza-
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tion of agriculture for his more pragmatic New Economic 
Policy (NEP). What the Soviets would do after foreign 
aid had stabilized the situation remained a point of 
speculation in the press. 
In comparison, the American Catholic press ex-
pressed hope that the Vatican's relief mission might 
not only feed the starving Russians, but that it might 
help convert the Orthodox masses to Catholicism. Only 
three articles in America, however, appeared because 
the hoped for conversions never materialized. Worse 
still in the Catholic press' view, when the Soviets 
tried the Petrograd clergy in March 1923, government 
officials expressed no gratitude for Catholic donations. 
When the Papal mission left the Soviet Union in 1924, 
Pope Pius xr ~ clearly disappointed, lambasted the Soviet 
government.64 
There were two striking consequences of the Papal 
mission revealed in the American press. First, the 
Vatican publicly condemned the Soviet Union as an out-
cast nation. This act was si~nificant because, even 
after the execution of Mgr~ Budkiewicz in 1923, the Pope 
issued no denunciation of the Soviet regime. Thus, the 
entire Roman Catholic Church was pitted against the 
Communist movement. Compromise was remote. Secondly, 
Edmund Walsh became a leading Catholic spokesman in 
America against the Soviet system. Serving as both 
head of the Papal mission and as Papal representative, 
he worked closely with Soviet officials whom he came 
to regard with utter contempt. His dual role was 
difficult, and there were conflicting goals for Walsh 
to somehow build an acceptable modus vivendi. Walsh 
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was not bombastic in his criticism. He studied and 
collected virtually ever Soviet publication available in 
the West. Indeed, his collection at Georgetown is con-
sidered one of the best. 
The idea of a Papal mission to the Soviet Union 
began with Benedict XV. In 1921, he authorized funds 
to go to an international relief organization in Geneva, 
Switzerland. 65 As reports further dramatized the disaster, 
Benedict XV desired a more direct approach. Giving food 
to the starving Russians could only help the Vatican's 
plans to convert the Orthodox, plans well known in the 
American Catholic press since 1916.66 
The Soviets, leary of the Vatican's designs, allowed 
the Pope to attach his mission to the larger American 
relief effort under Hoover. Benedict XV died before the 
Soviets issued their final approval, but the next Pope, 
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Pius XI, continued to support the mission. He agreed 
with the Soviet stipulation to appoint an American as 
the head of the Papal mission. Walsh accepted the 
appointment, and reluctantly agreed to assume responsi-
bility as Papal representative once Archbishop Cieplak 
was imprisoned in March 1923. The Soviets had wanted 
a full Papal Nuncio to help lend prestige to their 
regime, but they accepted Walsh and the Vatican's re-
lief supplies. 
Altogether there were five nations attached to the 
American Relief Administration. The composition of the 
Vatican's mission included originally thirteen members. 
By nationality there were two Americans, Walsh and Louis 
J. Gallagher (1885-1972), Walsh's biographer and fellow 
Jesuit, three Italians, two Czechs, three Germans, two 
Spaniards and one Greek. It was truly international in 
character with the members aware of how to conduct 
Eastern rite services another Vatican strategy besides 
food to attract the Orthodox. 
Before Walsh left America, he was director of the 
Catholic Apostolic delegation which collected funds 
worldwide for the Papal mission. The amount collected 
totaled $750,000, mostly donated by American Catholics. 67 
The entire American hierar~hy had conferred in Washington, 
D. C. to organize famine collections. Such leading 
American Catholics as the Archbishop of New York, 
Patrick J. Hayes (1867-1938) organized further fund 
drives. He issued an appeal to his pastors for famine 
relief on 20 October 1922.68 
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The Vatican's mission began operations in 
September 1922 in the Crimea. Walsh organized ninety-
two kitchens in ninety-two villages in one day. He 
expanded the mission to Moscow and Petrograd with the 
Soviets' consent. The maximum development of the 
mission occurred between March to September 1923. By 
this time, however, the initial predictions for success 
no longer appeared in the American Catholic press.6 9 
The Petrograd Catholic clergy trial precluded all the 
Vatican's plans to expand the mission. 
By late 1923, the Papal mission began experienc-
ing increasingly Soviet interference. The Pope threat-
ened to recall the mission when the Soviets placed a 
secret police agent in its Moscow office. 70 With 
Catholic contributions falling sharply after the trial, 
1 Pius XI knew that the mission's effectiveness was im-
periled. Added to the loss of revenue, Walsh had 
difficulties in negotiating with the Soviets. He held 
them in contempt, and he lacked an adequate staff to 
handle the many requests s~nt by the Holy See. 
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The Vatican recalled Walsh in December 1923 after 
his reports on the imprisoned Archbishop Cieplak, given 
to the Western press, raised Soviet demands for his dis-
missa1.71 The Soviets did not like Walsh's appeals to 
public opinion for the Archbishop's release. They dis-
liked pressure from -, publicity. Moreover, the Soviets 
objected to the elaborate residence in Moscow which 
supported the Papal mission. (See Appendix II) For 
such a residence, the Soviets desired to see an embassy, 
not a charitable mission headquarters. In Walsh's ab-
sence, the Reverend Edward Gehrmann (1888-1960), an 
original member of the mission, became the director 
until the Soviets expelled the entire staff in 1924 
after Lenin's death. 
To summarize the Papal mission's significance, it 
is important to note that its members worked exclusively 
among the Orthodox. The various Roman Catholic communi-
ties in the Soviet Union were not served by the relief 
effort. Hence, the Soviets were suspicious of the 
'Vatican's designs. They noted that other religious 
organizations attached to the American Relief Administra-
tion had helped their own denominations. Baptists, 
Methodists and Quakers located their fellow brethren 
in the Soviet Union and off~red assistance when it was 
needed. 7 2 The Soviets likened the mission's undertakings 
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to the Jes u i ts ' Prose 1 y ti ~~ in g ~ i.n : Russ i a ·:during ·the ·ea .t 1 y 
nineteenth century. The Catholics were seen as oppor-
tunists. 
The Soviets were likewise disappointed that an 
ambassador did not come with the mission. Pius XI him-
self encouraged this idea by increasing Walsh's powers 
but not allowing any form of recognition~ Thus, the 
Soviets concluded that the Vatican only wanted to gain 
converts during the famine and ignore the recognition 
question. The Soviets' struggles were seemingly unim-
portant to the Vatican, and after Lenin's death, the 
leadership agreed collectively to expel , the Papal mission 
as a dangerous counterrevolutionary element. 
The American secular press concentrated its cover-
age mostly on Hoover's efforts and not Soviet complaints. 
Reports on the Papal mission usually arose only when 
Walsh was having difficulties with Soviet authorities. 
Thus, the Papal mission appeared persecuted by Soviet 
interference in the secular press. Moreover, no articles 
suggested that the Vatican's representation was oppor-
tunistic. Baptists, Methodists and Quakers all had 
members sponsored in the American effort, and they too 
supported evangelizing. Therefore, the secular press 
did not see the Soviets' . suspicions as important• 
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The Famine appeared as a natural disaster in the 
secular press. No appraisals suggested that the Soviet 
agricultural policy was at fault. Rather, the combina-
tion of drought and civil war seemed responsible.73 
The assessments also supported American relief efforts. 
A huge grain surplus and a charitable missionary tradi-
tion among American churches made famine relief an 
acceptable foreign involvement. 
Support for American sacrifices continued from 
1921 to 1923. Duririg 1922, the prospects for a more 
severe famine saw swift American response. Meatless and 
wheatless days were begun by many American families. 
Seemingly the plight of the Russians was becoming a 
national, worthy cause.74 What changed the secular 
press' analysis was the Petrograd clergy trial in 1923. 
Significantly, famine coverage after March 1923 
in the secular press offered little encouragement for 
further American aid. Many editors praised past efforts, 
but they noted that the Sovi ets appeared ungrateful for 
'the vast supplies and money. The Friends of Russia 
issued its Society Relief Work Report in the San Fran-
cisco Examiner on 23 August 1923 on page twenty-six. 
It represented a typical survey of opinion in the 
secular press that past famine relief efforts were 
laudatory, but that future aid was no longer a likelihood. 
By 1924, reports of another Soviet famine drew few. 
calls in the American public for further action.75 
Overall, the secular press reported that the 
American relief efforts and the Vatican's attached 
mission did save lives in the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet government, ho~ever, gained no sympathy as it 
demonstrated little gratitude for the international 
assistance. Moreover, after the famine, the secular 
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press began examining more thoroughly the Soviet/ 
Vatican struggle. The end of famine relief coincided, 
with reports analyzing the validity of the Catholic's 
opposition to the Soviet regime. Thus, the conclusion 
of the Papal mission revealed the intense conflict that 
actually existed between the Soviets and the Vatican. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE PRAYER CRUSADE OF 1930 
Pope Pius XI's prayer crusade on 19 March 1930 
for those Roman Catholics persecuted in the Soviet 
Union received broad coverage in the American press. 
The accuracy of reporting world reaction and the 
nature of the conflict were sound in both the secular 
and Catholic press. Each institution had years of 
statistics on the Soviet/Vatican conflict. Know-
ledgeable commentary came notably from three men: 
Walter Duranty, Louis Fischer and Edmund Walsh. Each 
man had studied and assessed in detail the Soviet and 
Vatican positions. 
A comparison of the Catholic and secular press 
in America revealed a striking contrast. Both Duranty 
and Fischer acknowledged Soviet persecution, but they 
suggested that the uproar in the Western press was 
1
politically encouraged, and that not all of the Vatican's 
religious allies were forthright in their facts. For 
example, they portrayed the Anglican Church's accusa-
tions as past incidents, ones that occurred during the 
Russl·an c 1· ·1 Walsh, .however, cited Soviet decrees v1 war. 
and statistics from 1929 which revealed the incarceration 
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of Catholic priests and the closing of Catholic churches. 
All three agreed, however, that the catalyst which 
caused the Vatican outrage was the Soviet decree of 
8 April 1929 on religion. The document included over 
6,000 words, and it was by far the most comprehensive 
series of laws restricting religion. Basically, there 
were eight points outlined by the American secular 
press which Western churches opposed. 
First, religious organizations lost any legal 
status in the Soviet Union. Second, all churches had 
to register with the government or close. Third, no 
national church could exist. Fourth, no citizens 
could join a church until age eighteen, and the congre-
gation had to number at least twenty persons. Sixth, 
material assistance from a church to a member was pro-
hibited. Seventh, the Soviets banned all religious 
or special meetings. Finally, religious associations, 
cults and chapels lost any protection under religious 
laws.76 
These restrictions culminated in the Soviet 
control over religion. Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) 
promoted the laws, yet he stress~d to the Western 
press that since the promulgation of Lenin's constitu-
tion in February 1918, the Soviets had always intended 
to end religion's sway, especially the clergy's power, 
over the masses. Both Duranty and Fischer agreed with 
Stalin's explanation, and they agreed that had Lenin 
lived, he would have restricted religion. The Soviet 
decrees, then, appeared as part of the social class 
struggle in the Cornmuni st movement. Furthermore, 
Lenin's political philosophy was quoted more directly 
in the American secular press than in any of the other 
seven events in the Soviet/Vatican conflict. The fol-
lowing Lenin passage appeared often: 
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Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression, 
lying everywhere on the masses of the people who are 
oppressed by eternal work for others ... the helpless-
ness of the exploited classes in their struggle with 
the exploiters just as inevitably generates faith in 
a better life beyond the grave as the helplessness of 
the savage in his struggle with nature produces faith 
in gods ... Religion is the opium of the people.77 
The significance of quotations like the previous 
one revealed that the Soviets defended themselves on 
equal terms with the Western churches in the American 
secular press. The Vatican's crusade did not have a 
complete hold over a sympathetic public. Rather, the 
Soviet and the Vatican positions were debated, and 
cries of persecution no longer generated the overwhelm-
ing support of the secular press. 
The American secular press questioned critically 
the Vatican's charges. Commentary in the Nation on 
5 March 1930 concluded that the "outcry against the 
Soviets ... is purely fake. 11 78 Fischer stated further 
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that the Holy See's policy toward the Russian Orthodox 
Church in Poland was just as harsh as the Soviets' treat-
ment of Catholics in the Soviet Union. He claimed that 
in 1929 the Polish government, with the Vatican's consent, 
converted by force over 500 Russian Orthodox churches to 
serve as Catholic churches. Conclusively, Fischer stated 
that the Soviet/Vatican negotiations, · conducted sporadi-
cally between 1918 and 1927, included plans for the 
Catholic Church to supplant the Orthodox Church. 
Continued in the same article, Duranty reported 
that the religious furor had support from the European 
business community. The growing exports from the Soviet 
Union became a menace to the balance of trade, noted 
Duranty. Moreover, he depicted the outcry in England as 
part of the To~y political smear against Prime Minister 
Ramsay MacDonald who favored Soviet recognition and trade. 
The New Republic's commentary concurred with the 
Nation's. It noted that many priests were executed not 
because of their religious beliefs but rather for their 
' involvement in counterrevolutionary activity. Also, the 
New Republic claimed that the Catholic Church distorted 
the figures on church closings. Of the total 50,000 
churches in the Soviet Union, only six percent were 
closed reported an article on 5 March 1930. Moreover, 
millions of Russians appeared free to worship privately 
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with many displaying icons in their homes.79 
Further commentary in the secular press questioned 
the Western business community's support for the relig-
ious crusade. It was noted that, although Pius XI, the 
Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Bishop William T. 
Manning of New York's Anglican Church, the Lutheran 
Council and the American Jewish Congress had legitimate 
protests, others, indifferent to organized religion, 
feared instead the Soviet Five Year Plan. 
Many Western economic observers noted how the 
Soviets viewed religion and the kulak peasants as a 
small-scale capitalist unit. This system, the Soviets 
proclaimed, had to be uprooted because the unit opposed 
the collectivization of agriculture and the industriali-
zation of the country. By subsidizing their industries 
and controlling labor costs, the Soviets exported massive 
quantities of raw materials at lower than Western market 
prices. In summary, then, the Western business community 
supported the religious campaign because economic sanc-
' tions against the Soviets might ensue with the moral 
support of religious leaders. 80 
Fischer and Duranty championed the Soviet position 
because they desired to expose the economic motives of 
the West. Both men had limited ac~ess to the Soviet 
Union, and they admired the progressive, scientific 
methods of the Communist movement. They likewise 
decried political opportunists using the religious 
protests to further the economic isolation of the 
Soviets. Their final analysis concluded that it was 
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the fear of the Soviets' Five Year Plan and not the 
Pope's prayer crusade which motivated many in the West. 
The secular press assessed the crusade with the 
broadest coverage and commentary of the seven events 
which characterized the Soviet/Vatican conflict from 
1917 to 1933. The New York Times carried Pius XI's 
letter denouncing the Soviet anti-religious policy.Bl 
American Catholics looked for support from Europe, and 
they were not disappointed. Unlike the overwhelming 
European support for the Petrograd Catholic clergy in 
1923, however, the prayer crusade created a number of 
positions. For example, the reaction of the British press 
displayed a variety of opinion. The Tory Morning Post 
supported the Vatican, The Daily Worker was pro-Soviet, 
and the Daily Mail urged moderation. 82 
French reaction included meetings between Jews and 
Protestants in support of the Pope's crusade. A state-
ment appeared from the French Protestant Federation, the 
Russian ~migr~ clergy and the Grand Rabbi of France, 
Israel Levi. This unity was similar to American unity.
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Reaction from Germany included remarks by cardinal 
Michael von Faulhaber (1869 - 1952) of Munich. His sermon 
of 11 February 1930 was quoted at length by both the 
Ne = York T1'rnes84 d th c 85 n an e ommonweal. Another promin-
ent Cardinal, Joseph MacRory (1861-1945) of Armagh, 
Ireland, also had a sermon published in the New York 
Times on 2 March 1930 on page five . Taken together, the 
entire European Catholic community had more of its com-
mentary printed in support of the Vatican than in any 
of the other seven events. 
Other American newspapers concentrated more on 
the reaction in the United States. The Chicago Tribune 
did not report the Soviet position and did not carry their 
statements to the Western press. Rather, it favored the 
Vatican's views. Thus, it did not objectively analyze 
the situation . Typical coverage concerned sacrilegious 
acts such as the destruction of church bells and the 
closing of churches reported on 18 Marc h 1930 on page one. 
The newspaper voiced its support for local prot,ests against 
the Soviets, and it encouraged observation of the 19 March 
day of prayer. 
Reaction from the San Francisco Chronicle blamed 
Stalin as the instigator of the anti-religious campaign. 
The newspaper outlined his policy on 17 March 1930 on 
page fou r. Locally, the edi tor supported such actions 
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as the Friends of Russian Freedom Soviety reorganizing 
in favor of Pius XI's crusade. Leo Nicholas Yakovlev 
became president of the group which had dissolved it-
self during the Provisional Government in 1917. Its 
primary task during the crusade was to contact agents 
in the Soviet Union and collect evidence on the religi-
ous persecutions. 
Further reaction in San Francisco included mass 
meetings at the Catholic Mission Dolores where Jesuit 
Father Victor White spoke against the Soviets. He 
cited American Catholic periodical literature which de-
scribed how the Pope's call for prayers created a spiri-
tual unity. White concluded that Soviet persecution 
represented a moral danger to the West.8 6 
Protests against PiusXI's crusade also received 
broad coverage in the secular press. Mass meetings at 
the Bronx Coliseum were reported in detail. The letter 
supporting the Soviets after the protest appeared in the 
New York Times. The American author, Theodor Dreiser, 
'was the leading writer.87 The American Communist Party 
wanted sympathetic people but non-Communists to make 
such public statements as this one, thus trying to demon-
strate a broad support. 
Significantly, the Soviets rallied their supporters 
more effectively in this struggle with the Vatican than in 
any of the other events characterizing their conflict. 
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They likewise received coverage almost equal to the 
supporters of the Vatican. The Soviet countercampaign 
included using prominent Orthodox clergymen. Metropoli-
tan Sergius (1867-1944) denounced Pius XI, and he denied 
reports in the Western press of Soviet persecution. 
Reportedly , he had the support of his clergy. These 
clergy, however, held their posts at the behest of the 
Soviet government. Sergius held an interview with mem-
bers of the Western press and recited prepared comments. 
The charges presented stated that: 
The Pope considers himself the vicar of Christ, but 
Christ suffered for the oppressed and downtrodden, 
whereas the Pope in his declaration proved himself 
to be in the same camp with the English landowners 
and the Franco-Italian 'Money-bags. ,88 
Sergius claimed further that Pius XI was a warmonger, 
and that the Orthodox did not need the prayers or protec-
tion of the Catholic Church. The Pope desired only to 
exploit the Orthodox Church, Sergius noted, in order to 
extend his authority. Significantly, no one surmized in 
the American press, at the time of the interview, that 
Soviet authorities instructed Sergius. The Metropolitan's 
remarks were attributed rather as genuine and a reflec-
tion of the historical animosity between the Orthodox 
Church and the Roman Catholic Church. 
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The American Catholic press examined the entire 
Soviet anti-religious campaign, but it did not respond 
to Sergius' charges which many considered sacrilegious. 
In the December 1929 issue of Catholic World, an article 
titled, 11 Soviet Anti-God Laws, 11 outlined the 8 April 1929 
decrees.89 A detailed report on the condition of Russian 
churches also appeared in the Catholic press. It was re-
ported that the international neglect and closing of the 
churches threatened the existence of the nearly 1,000 
year history of Christian worship in Russia.90 The 
practice of 'saving' churches by converting them into 
theaters or museums with anti-religious exhibitions was 
excoriated as a sacrilegious policy. 
Enthusiastic reports appeared in the American 
Catholic press on the worldwide reaction favoring Pius XI's 
crusade. An article in the Catholic World titled, "Pro-
tests aganist Soviet war on Religion," noted that the 
unity of faiths, begun after the 1923 clergy show trials, 
still existed and continued to manifest_ itself. Awareness 
of Soviet persecution was at its height, and the support 
from Protestant churches for the Pope was an untold his-
torical event.91 
Two critical commentaries on religious conditions 
in the Soviet Union appeared in Commonweal. An article 
published on 2 April 1930 on pages 605 and 606 titled, 
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"Russia without God," lamented that the sacraments were 
no longer dispensed freely. Births, marriages and 
deaths were recorded by civil register,~ benefit 
of clergy. Religious processions were banned. Religious 
education, moreover, for children was proscribed, and the 
Soviets restricted publication of religious literature. 
Only the government press printed Bibles and never an 
adequate supply. 
Another article in Commonweal titled, "Moscow and 
the Churches,'' offered a more objective analysis on the 
Soviet anti-religious attitude than any article in the 
Catholic press during the 1930 prayer crusade. The author, 
Paul Scheffer, a correspondent for the Berlin Tageblatt 
stationed in Moscow until December 1929, wrote the article 
when he arrived in Washington, D.C. He was not a Catholic, . 
but the editors of the Commonweal valued his commentary. 
He concluded that religious persecution had been 
"systematically and purposefully carried on since the 
creation of the Bolshevist state, even though with vary-
' ing degrees of severity. 11 92 Scheffer depicted the anti-
religious drive in terms of social struggle. The Soviets 
desired to end the influence of religion and the idea of 
private property which Judea-Christian theology and prac-
tice supported. The Soviets, -he concluded, would persist 
in their campaign, and pressure was likely to incre~se due 
76 
to the goals set under the Five Year Plan, notably the 
collectivization of agriculture and the industrialization 
of the country. 
Overall, the American Catholic community adopted 
without question Pius XI's prayer crusade. The camapign 
squarely placed the Soviet Union as an outcast nation. 
As a political doctrine, Communism in practice became 
anathema to Roman Catholics. The Catholic clergy in 
America derided the doctrines and ,practices of Communism 
with increasing frequency. Led by Father Walsh's sub-
stantial research and informed commentary, there was no 
debate as to whether or not Soviet persecutions were real 
or fictitious. The New York Times carried the most indepth 
Walsh commentary in articles from January to March 1930 
concerning the Vatican's crusade.93 
In summary, the increasing reports on religious 
persecution in the Soviet Union found in the American 
press greatly reinforced the idea of a Soviet/Vatican 
struggle. In this upheaval, many journalists undertook 
'an objective assessment , of the situation. Facts on the 
Russification of the Soviet culture revealed a seculari-
zation of society. The policy of self-determination was 
also debated in the press, and more sympathy was accorded 
the Soviets than in previous encounters with the Roman 
Catholic Church. One important outcome was that Stalin 
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appeared as the undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union. 
The quasi-collegiate leadership after Lenin's death in 
1924 no longer remained. The Catholic press acknowledged 
this change by dropping its vague charges that a 'secular-
ized Jewish conspiracy' operated the Soviet government. 
Although lambasting the anti-religious policy of 
the Soviets was widely accepted in the American press, 
a great deal of commentary examined more closely the 
Vatican's attitude. Such journalists as Duranty and 
Fischer discounted many of the accusations, and Fischer 
went so far as to label the Roman Church an opportunistic 
power. Despite the Pope's crusade, the debate over recog-
nition of the Soviets continued to be raised. Although 
this debate was dampened by the 1930 crusade, the worsen-
ing economic depression and a change in the Presidency in 
1932 once again brought the question of recognition before 
the American public. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE RECOGNITION DEBATE, 1933 
The deba t e concerning the recognition of the 
Soviet Union began in earnest during the 1932 presi-
dential campaign. Father Walsh approved President 
Hoover's policy of nonrecognition, and he encouraged 
Catholics to support this position. Walsh analyzed 
the Soviets' desire for American recognition in a 
14 October 1932 speech before the Civic Federation of 
the Lawyers' Club in New York City. His statements 
about the conditions in the Soviet Union were accurate. 
He asserted that Soviet finances were in a critical 
situation owing to the global depression. They needed 
add i tional capital to achieve the goals of their Five 
Year Plan, Walsh noted, and moreover, increased credits 
and trade might come with American recognition. Finally, 
Walsh surmized that the specter of famine loomed in the 
1 Soviet Union due to the harsh measures of collectiviza-
tion. The Soviets needed American grain.94 
The missing element in the presidential election, 
Wa l s h noted, was t he Democratic party's nominee Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt's (1882-1945) attitude on recognition. 
Walsh suggeste:El that, if Roosevelt became president·, he 
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should set certain conditions if he decided to favor a 
recognition policy. The primary condition in Walsh's 
opinion was that the dissolution of the Comintern or 
Third International must occur before the United States 
accredited an ambassador to the Soviet Union. Walsh had 
the Vatican's support in this matter as Pius XI under-
stood the power of government sponsored propaganda from 
the Soviet Union, and the Pope would welcome any help in 
silencing it. 
After the election and Roosevelt's victory, Walsh 
publicly chided members of the United States Senate for 
encouraging recognition without stipulations. He saw their 
efforts as a usurpation of presidential authority which 
alone should conduct foreign relations with the Senate's 
advice and consent. He objected to certain members taking 
a leading role and trying to sway public opinion. 95 
It was important that Roosevelt neutralize Walsh's 
influence if he were to pursue recognition. Significantly, 
Roman Catholics were a large group in the Democratic co-
' alition which Roosevelt could not afford to ignore. 
The task of appeasing this group was delicate and compli-
cated since by 1933 the American ·Catholic Church was one 
of the strongest and most articulate anti-Communist re-
ligious organization due larg~ly to Walsh's influence. 
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Since the 1923 Catholic clergy trial in Moscow, 
Walsh had been a staunch opponent of recognition. His 
knowledge of the Soviet Union was substantial. He was 
not a demagogue invoking 'red scare' tactics. Rather, he 
took the moral position and cited documented cases of 
Soviet religious persecution. Thus, his opposition on 
recognition was a matter to be dealt with seriously. 
When Roosevelt announced his intentions to nego-
tiate with Maxim Litvinov (1876-1951), the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, he arranged · a meeting with Walsh at the White 
House to seek his support. Walsh concurred with the 
President's plan to meet with Litvinov. He understood 
that Roosevelt would ask for the dissolution of the Third 
International along with guarantees that Americans could 
exercise religious freedom when in the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, in his own words, Walsh claimed that he 
would not oppose subsequent negotiations since he believed 
that the ''President should not be embarrassed in the exer-
cise of his constitutional prerogative of conducting 
foreign affairs. 11 96 
When recognition occurred in late November 1933, 
however, Walsh waited in vain to learn of the disbanding 
of the Comintern. Not until 1943 would Stalin, out of 
requests from the Western Allies, close the organization. 
Walsh demanded that recognition be withdrawn since the 
\ 
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Soviet~ violated their pledge. For ten years, dating 
from his duaJ. appo intment as director of the Papal farnin€ 
reU_c=f mission and as PapaJ. re presentati·ve in 1923, i~alsh 
oppo ,sed re c ognition because of the power of the Conin tern I s 
propagand a . He at ated publicly that: 
If the Soviet pleads inability to ccnt~ol t he Third 
Intern ational , it rnakE:s virtual confes si on t,ha t ther i:> 
i s a 1; 0 lit :i. c:1 l power ,v~.thin its te:c r itori:-d ju.risdic-
t i 011 super i0r to o. nd d omina t ir..g governmen t , hence the 
real sovereign . In that case, the Soviet Government 
does not exercise sovereignt y, and the United States 
s h o u l d w i th draw· rec can it j_ on a :.1 d treat wi th th ,?. ind :i -
ca ted ru ler , not wit~ a subordinate. 97 
Suppo r ting Walsh 1 s opinion on recognition was the Catholic 
pre~:: S c:-:_;rnrn.entary. The Catholic World and Commonweal 
r~ d i. t. •.:H ::, c p ~) 0 s e d re~ co ~Fl i t i on u n t i l out s t. and i n g pr 0 b 1. e rn s 
were ~egotiatee. Eii t ors of America , however, were ambi-
v a ~-en t s j_ n. c Ei !TL 2t1.1 y Jes v. 1 t s we u~ unsure i f form a l r e cog n i -
• 1,. ...., • t -r . ti. o:-; 1{0 :.1 j_ d al. J ow t hPm. q rea t0. r c.:tc~cess 1n to tll,~ ,,,ov1 e , Ln 1 on 
a E.= Arne-r ~-(.: r.:u 1 c i t. i. ~ ~- ,-:: n s , o r L f t b e y w o 1.:: l d st Li. 1 f a c E~ per s e c n --· 
t 1.c-n. r_·c11e mo s t s·,1ce:inct cc1r:rn(:ntz:.ry c :·:lr•_·ie -r .~o ..:n th f~ 
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First, the editors claimed that the Soviets did 
not respect the obligations of international law. 
Second, no body of laws or judicial system existed in 
the Soviet Union to guarantee the protection of the con-
tractual rights of foreigners. Third, the Soviets 
opposed liberty of conscience and the exercise of re-
ligious worship. Fourth, the editors noted the diffi-
culties of the English and French in their diplomatic 
relations with the Soviets. Finally, on largely moral 
grounds, it was felt that it would be "illogical, stul-
tifying and shameful for the United States to extend 
recognition. 11 98 
The Commonweal also carried Walsh's objections. 
The periodical noted the improved trade possibilities 
favored by some people should recognition occur, but the 
periodical dismissed them as speculation. It was primar-
ily the moral objection to the Soviets' persecution of 
religion that the editors stressed. They concurred with 
Walsh's moral argument and offered this summary. 
He is bitterly and unjustly opposed to the war upon 
religion, to the suppression of the fundamental rights 
of the Christian conscience, which prevail there. He 
believes that if the government of the United States 
were to recognize, after fourteen years of silence, a 
social order guilty of persecution in the worst sense, 
the effect would be to endorse spiritual tyranny.
99 
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In its 16 June 1933 issue, the Cornmonweal re-
ported on the 23 April 1933 radio program, "Church 
of the Air." On the program, the issue of trade 
relations became the most important angle of the 
supporters of recognition. The editors dismissed 
accusations in the secular press after the program 
that Catholics were not objective about trade rela-
tions. Being objective, they noted, did not bar 
definite conclusions or convictions. Furthermore, 
Catholics had as much right as anyone to warn that 
investment in the Soviet Union was too uncertain.100 
When addressing the issue of trade, Commonweal 
opposed extending credits to the Soviets. The edi-
tors saw this proposed transaction as too risky, and 
they believed that the Soviets would default. The 
editors also noted that propaganda from the Third 
International urged that the Communist movement 
should overthrow capitalist countries by exploiting 
economic benefits from them. Overall, then, their 
assessment doubted that formal recognition would 
improve the balance of trade. 1O1 
Despite these economic objections, which were 
largely speculative, the historical arguments launched 
by the Commonweal were accurate and objective. In its 
6 October 1933 issue, the periodical examined A;nerican/ 
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Russian relations from 1780 to the present. It concluded 
that: 
It is obvious that the friendliness displayed in 
Russian-American relations for over a century was 
not_m~tiva~ed ~y a~y sympathy for the respective 
political institutions of either of the two coun-
tries. The reason for this friendliness lies much 
d~eper. . !t i~ to be fou~d mainly in the geo-poli-
tical similarity of Russia and America.102 
This was a sound appraisal because in western Asia and 
the Pacific, both Russia and the United States sought 
to expand their territory and influence. By 1933, 
both were concerned by Japanese expansion in these re-
gions. Thus, a Soviet/American rapprochement might 
indeed curb any imperialist designs by a third party. 
When the Roosevelt/Litvinov meeting was announced, 
the Commonweal responded emphatically again that it 
opposed recognition. Taking a moral stance, the editors 
assessed the Communist movement in these terms: 
It is the growth of militant atheism - of a conta-
gious spirit of the repudiation of all forms of 
belief in God - which is more dangerous to the 
nations of the western . world, our own among them, 
· · 103 than t~e Red Army of Soviet Russia. 
Sensing that the debate was leaning toward those 
favoring recognition, the Commonweal provided a defini-
tive statement on recognition. Significantly, the ob-
jections raised did not . suggest that Catholics must 
withdraw from participating in American politics or in 
their support of the Roosevelt administration. Rather, 
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the statement demonstrated the active response of the 
Catholic Church which was not in any way divorcing it-
self from delicate political issues. The editors de-
clard that: 
The Commonweal has over and over again published 
its own appeal, and the arguments of other writers, 
against the recognition of Russia by this country. 
We have considered that the enhanced world pres-
tige which the organized atheism of Russia would 
gain by such a formal recognition would be a loss 
to religion, and to all forms of civilization 
based upon or still influenced by religion, out-
weighing all the advantages in trade or in the 
arena of international politics which the propon-
ents of recognition claim for that policy.104 
When recognition occurred, the editors maintained 
their moral objections but remained moderate in their 
tone. They appraised the President's actions and con-
cluded that he 11 did what he could and secured reason-
able conditions for civilized human intercourse between 
Russia and the United States. 11 l05 The editors also ap-
proved the assurance given by the Soviets that Americans 
would be granted liberty of conscience in Russia. 
They concluded that the power of the United States would 
7 insure Soviet compliance. The Vatican had likewise set 
similar conditions in the Treaty of Riga in 1921 for 
Catholics in the Soviet Union only to see them disappear 
during the show trials of 1923. 
In surnmaryj the editors concluded that Roosevelt 
would intervene to mitigate for the p~rsecuted. They 
also awaited the announcement of the dissolution of the 
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Comintern. The editors believed, as did Walsh, that 
Roosevelt mentioned the condition to Litvinov and that 
the Soviets agreed to the stipulation. There was no 
statement in the Commonweal when the dissolution failed 
to materialize. 
Not surprizingly, the leading American journalist 
in the secular press favoring recognition was Fischer. 
He wrote several articles for the Nation during 1932 
and 1933 on recognition. His conclusions were almost 
opposite the opinions in the Catholic press. Fischer 
assessed that Communist propaganda had no significant 
impact in America. Furthermore, he claimed that the 
Comintern no longer posed the threat of revolution in 
capitalist nations as it did in 1919. Europe was no 
longer economically and politically devastated from 
World War I, noted Fischer, and the Soviets were stable 
and powerful, thus, unlikely to want revolutions occur-
ing in countries it needed as trading partners. He 
excoriated the 'red scare' tactics used by opponents 
1 of rec o g nit ion and de c 1 are d that " Communism in the 
United States is a minor movement which demagogues use 
as a bogy to frighten the stupid and attain their own 
ends."106 
Not all of Fischer's assessments diverged from 
the Commonweal's appraisals. He too agreed that Japanese 
expansion caused alarm in the U.S. and the u.s ; s.R. 
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An alliance might thwart the imperialist designs of 
Japan especially in China, noted Fischer. This ap-
praisal was Fischer's main point. He saw the rise of 
Japan as the most important reason for recognition, con-
cluding that the U.S. needed to protect its Pacific 
interests. 
Fischer was less gracious in criticizing the 
opponents of recognition. He derided Hoover's nonrecog-
nition policy, claiming that the former President's 
"innate conservatism" and "imperialist tendencies" 
prevented him from viewing the Soviets pragmatically. 107 
Fischer also speculated that Hoover's vanity was 
wounded when the Soviets failed to show sufficient 
gratitude for American relief during the famine in the 
early 1920's. Significantly, these charges were the 
same ones Fischer leveled at the Vatican during its 
struggle with the Soviets especially during Pius XI's 
1930 prayer crusade. 
The editor of the Nation supported Fischer's 
1 • • v1ewpo1nt. Oswald Garrison Villard (1872-1949) favored 
the improved trade possibilities that recognition would 
,. 
incur. He disregarded much of the ~estern churches' 
polemi cs against the Soviets, and he sarcastically 
dubbed the Bolsheviks as "the would be destroyers of 
the sacred Christian religion." 108 v{11ard believed 
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that the churches were too vociferous in their attack. 
Their charges created the threat of a Communist menace 
which fueled in turn a backlash and gave rise to such 
men as Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) in Germany. Conclu-
sively, he felt that the religious counterpropaganda 
was unnecessary and potentially dangerous. Villard 
believed that equa~ing Communism with the entire poli-
tical left's social agenda caused a polarization, and 
one outcome was that people supported positions of the 
extreme right as their salvation rather than seeking a 
moderate consensus of progressive reforms. 
Compared to the Catholic press' assessment, the 
secular press viewed recognition in more pragmatic 
and not moral terms. The economic benefits from recog-
nition were considered more obtainable by both the 
Nat ion and the New Republic than by the Cornrnon-·weal. 
In its 29 November 1933 issue, the New Republic pub-
1 i shed an article titled, 11 Russia and America. Strike 
Hands. 11 109 In its cornrnen tary, it recalled that it 
had favored recognition almost from the beginning of 
the Soviet Union's existence. Increased trade gained 
by the rapprochement could only help abate the economic 
ills in America. Moreover the war debt questioned 
proved an outdated issue as the Allies' debt was largely 
cancelled, why not Russia's, declar-ed the article• 
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The article approved the Soviets' pledge to end 
the Third International and cease all revolution prop-
aganda. It cited also that ''the great campaign for 
religious freedom for foreigners in Russia ... turns 
out to have been painfully unnecessary. 11 110 This 
judgement came after Litvinov read a host of Soviet 
decrees and laws allowing the exercise of religious 
expression in the Soviet Union to the western press. 
What the New Republic failed to note was the costs to 
individuals who chose to exercise their religious 
rights. 
The periodical favored an American/Soviet under-
standing because Germany and Japan became further iso-
lated. The danger of war seemed averted because the two 
largest land powers, the U.S. and the u.s.s.R. sought 
common ground. Part of the formal recognition might 
entail discussions on curbing Japanese expansion in Asia 
and the Pacific and German threats to redraw the map of 
Eastern Europe. 
In conclusion, the overall coverage on the recog-
nition debate revealed two distinct opinions. First, 
the Catholic press raised moral objections. The sta-
tistics on persecution were there, and it looked unlikely 
that _Joseph Stalin would honor the religious freedoms 




Second, the secular press took a more pragmatic 
The Soviets were a world power, and recognition 
would benefit America in terms of trade and checking 
the expansion of Germany and Japan. The secular press 
discounted the moral objections of the churches as 
early as the prayer crusade of 1930. The Catholic press 
discounted the envisioned trade surplus. The only area 
of agreement was that the dissolution of the Third 
International would ease concern over Soviet calls for 
world revolution. The virulent propaganda was disliked 
and feared in the West, thus its end would create a 
calmer, more rational climate for mutual relations. 
Only the Catholic press lamented when the Soviets 
failed to close the Comintern. 
CO n Cl lJ.S i On 
Although ending this study in 1933 may seem 
arbitrary, there are sound reasons for selecting this 
date. With the recognition question settled in 1933, 
America began a new chapter in its relations with the 
Soviets. The Vatican adapted to this new circumstance, 
and Pius XI encouraged the American Catholic hierarchy 
to have the U.S. government intercede on behalf of the 
persecuted in the Soviet Union. Stalin had virtually 
consolidated the state's power over the Roman Catholic 
Church in 1933, and he saw little need to increase any 
restrictions. Also, the rise of Hitler and his concordat 
with the Vatican moved the Church further away from a 
modus vivendi with the Soviets. 
Significantly, the seven events which characterized 
the Soviet/Vatican conflict in the American press did not 
always reveal the animosity between the two powers. The 
two 1917 revolutions seemed to offer a unique opportunity 
to expand Catholicism. The Genoa Conference and to some 
extent the Papal famine relief mission also reportedly 
created favorable contacts whereby a concordat might en-
sue. It was not until the 1923 Petrograd clergy trial 




After examining American opinion on the Soviet/ 
Vatican conflict from 1917 to 1933, six important con-
sequences are discernible. First, the Roman Catholic 
Church emerged as the staunchest religious opponent of 
the Communist movement. Pope Pius XI became a leading 
opposition figure which was significant for several 
reasons. To begin with, although the Catholic Church 
suffered under the Soviets, the losses incurred in no 
way compared to the huge sacrifices made by the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Indeed, the Orthodox clergy led by 
Patriarch Tikhon failed to unite against the Soviets. 
Tikhon's successor, Metropolitan Sergius, avoided con-
frontation and sought a rapprochement with Stalin. 
Finally, the emigre clergy in Europe and North and South 
America failed to agree on whether to support Sergius or 
oppose the modus vivendi. Thus, the Orthodox Church, 
which had substantial reasons for denouncing the Soviets, 
abdicated its role to the more organized and wordly Holy 
See. 
Another noticeable consequence arising from the 
Soviet/Vatican conflict was the growing ecumenical move-
ment in America. Leading bishops and rabbis from 
Protestant and Jewish churches agreed with the Pope that 
Communism threatened religious liberty. This common cause/ 
common enemy approach was unique in the U.S. Catholics 
in Poland and the Baltic states failed to unite with the 
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Eastern Orthodox in defying the Soviets. Instead, 
Catholic officials in Poland seized Orthodox churches 
in the Belorussian and Ukrainian territories won in the 
1919-1921 Soviet/Polish war. Many Catholics in Eastern 
Europe also believed that the Jews were responsible for 
the spread of the Bolshevik armies, thus no one sought 
Jewish support in protesting Soviet atrocities. Only 
in America did substantial dialogue among the various 
churches arise from the perceived Soviet threat. 
Perhaps the most devastating consequence from the 
Vatican's disapproval of the Soviets was the anti-
Semitic accusations raised by the Church in defining 
Communism. Commentary in the Jesuit periodical America 
made many claims of a Bolshevist/Jewish conspiracy. 
For its part, the Holy See did little to enlighten 
Catholics that Bolsheviks who were ethnic Jews were also 
completely secularized. This distortion was partially 
responsible for the Holocaust because many Catholics in 
Eastern Europe remained indifferent to the plight of the 
Jews during World War II. 
Indifference to the Jews' plight was likewise 
noticeable in the American Catholic Church. No promin-
ent Catholic leader objected to the American immigra-
tion quotas for Jews when evidence from Nazi Germany in 
h · per1·1 American the 1930's suggested that t ey were 1n · 
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Catholic radio commentators repeated, rather, the belief 
that a Bolshevik-Jewish plot threatened Europe, and that 
Hitler stood as a defender of the West. 
Because the previous legacy was inconsistent 
with what Church leaders knew, the failure of the Holy 
See to dispel the Bolshevik-Jewish conspiracy myth cost 
many lives. Ignorance was not an excuse. The study of 
the Soviets had become a priority of the Holy See. The 
Russicum Collegium in Rome and the School , for Foreign 
Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. 
were but two institutions where the Church trained its 
clergy about the Soviets. The extensive collections on 
the Soviets should have made clear to Catholic scholars 
that the Jews were in no way responsible for the rise 
of Communism. Thus, although the Catholic Church pro-
moted the indepth study of the Soviet Union, Catholic 
scholars failed to discount the Bolshevik-Jewish conspiracy 
myth. 
The last two consequences are related. Because of 
, the Soviet/Vatican struggle, American Catholics emerged 
from their exclusiveness, and they became a strong poli-
tical force. Despite the resurgence in anti-Catholicism 
during the 1920's, Catholic leaders expanded missions and 
charitable foundations in the U.S. Catholic leaders en-
couraged their fellow members to unite with other 
Christians in opposing the Communist movement. Hence, 
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Catholics became moral leaders. Roman Catholics had 
also become an important part of the Democratic party 
coalition in 1932. Although their efforts to block the 
recognition of Soviet Russia failed, their opinion was 
not ignored. Catholic leaders received invitations to 
the White House, and they were briefed by President 
Roosevelt. They were part of the establishment and no 
longer considered outsiders in a predominantly Protestant 
America. 
Overall, then, American opinion on the first sixteen 
years of the Soviet/Vatican struggle saw the Catholic 
Church emerge as the defender of religious liberty and a 
staunch opponent of the political left. The Holy See was 
successful in creating for itself a moral leadership role 
against the spread of Communism. By emphasizing the im-
portance of traditional values, the Vatican became a more 
tolerable symbol in America. The moral authority of the 
Pope became respected as he undertook the task of articu-
lating against the Soviets. In America, then, Catholics 
' began to enjoy an increased stature due in part to their 
united front against the spread of Communism. 
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WALSH TO CREEDEN, 27 SEPTEMBER 1923 
Your very welcome letter of August 18 reached rn e 
to d a Y r ; : Pt; rn be r . ~ 7_ , a~~ ~ ~ ~n h u r r ~ i n g . t. o g-et a f e 1·l 1 i n e s 
to you ~y tne nex~ ~cour1er ~no lea~ es 1n a few hou rs for 
Warsaw. I do not trust the Russian post, as the few 
.l e t t e r s 1·i hi ch have come th a t w 2. y bear c 1 ear s i g 11 s O f ha v _ 
i D. g b e 2 !':. 0 p en '2 d 2 :!1 C. re 3. d by t 1-J. e " G . ? . lJ . 11 ( Bo l '.3 !1 C' .,_r i ]<: ,_ e: . :- e 
Po lice). Hence w·e send the mail to Vatican by courie r 2. nd 
it is pos ted from the Vatican. That is why t~e time is s 
l on g . 
As you can re2dily i1nag ine, I was delight ed to ha.vi_ 
the j_e t i_· -,.::c ',·.' i th the very intimate new s of things Arner j_ c 2. n 
esp e c i 2 .. :i. l y For e i g n Se rvi c e n e 1·t s . . . . I have been t .r y i n g 
rn y be s t t o g e t back but the Vat i can does not s e e rn t o 1·/ a n. t 
to let rne go yet . I was in Rome in J·uJ.y 2nd made tent a-
tive 2r ra.ngeme nts to f i nish as :.rnon as possible and get. 
back to the U.S.A. But despite the promise which the 
Ho ly Fathc~r ma de himself, i.e . t.o appoint a Bishop or 
Apostol i c Delegate who would take over the ha lf hundred 
different jobs I have been holding here , nothing ha s be en 
done yet . Until tha t is done , I cannot hold out rnuc}1 
hope. 
As y ou may suspect, relief work for the starving forms 
but a small fraction of my Kork at present, the chi ef oc-
cup~tions being rather those of an unofficial r ep r esent a-
tive of the Va tican in dealings with the Soviet goverrn~ ent . 
At present the Holy See is negotiating the liberation of 
Archbishop Cieplak and some 22 Catholic priests impris oned 
by the Bolsheviks, and until that is successfully accom -
p lished, I know the y want me to kee~ on the job. But i t 
is a continual penance of the most pronounced type as th e 
Bolsheviks ar e the lowest type o f humanity I can imagin e . 
I have been ins tructed by the Holy See td keep up the us-
ua l diplomatic fo rm in dealing with them but I assur e you 
it is like casting the proverbial pearls before swin e . I 
shall have much t o tell yo u when I return which one does 
not commit to p ape r in Russia . 
I have just succeed e d in obtaining one thing which 
the Vatican wanted. When the Bolsheviks were driven back 
from Poland two years ago they b rought many treasure s 
from robbed churches . Among other things they desecrat ed 
the relics of Blessed Andrew Bobola (o f the Society) whi c~ 
105 
106 
we re highly venerated in Poland. They brought the 
r e lics to Moscow and have them on exhibi't 1· 011 a -i= ,- _. , • .c • s a so rt 
□ L. ~~01c~le OL holy things. I have just succeeded in 
ge-c.t.1ng them away from the m and am sending the t t l v,-1- · ...... , m· B - h . ~ _ . , rn o , 1e 
~ L, =L a. n . ~he 0.1s _ev1Ls !12d 2..1ways refus e d the r equ e st 
or G~e Po~1sh.gove~nment_ but I have been able . to pers u-
~ : ~ L~em to .L g1 ve tn~. ~el 1c,s to . the Va ti can. The y h ave 
a~~ee~, . on G~ e con~~t~on tnat 1n transporting the m to 
Ror t1 e .1 oo no1.., p e r m1r, "Chern to pass through Polish t erri -
t o r y . So I 2m sending P. Gallagher with thern to Od e ss a , 
t h e nc e by Blac k Se ~ to Constantinople and thenc e to 
Brindisi in I t aly . 
. _ In_ord~r to procure the release of Archbishop 
C:i. E:p i. ak it w1ll Le necE:ssc.ry tog-et certain Communi sts 
in e x change, i.e., Communists held by various gove~n-
rnen t s abroad. So ·we are treating at pres e nt with t wo 
c;;fove r n rnents, and when that is successru.lly f ini s l1 ed , r 
h o pe I will 0 e one step ne arer home and Fore ign Servic e . 
In the process of reo r ganizing the Pontifical 
Pe li e f Missi on, I have jus t taken over a new hous e th a t 
h a d be e n ha l f ·w r e ck e d du r i n g the Rev o l u t i o 11 and a rn en --
ga ged in r e storing it. After digging the bull e ts ou t 
of the wall and plastering up shell holes on the ou ts i de , 
a s well a s spending about $10 ,000 in genera l rep a i rs , 
the Ho ly See now has a Moscow headquarters not i n fe r i o r 
t o a ny foreign Mission in Moscow. .. .. In thi s new hou se , 
once one of the great rnc:1.nsions of r-Ioscow and ab ou t a s big 
a s t h2 Ol d North Building, 1 shall hold forth i n papa J. 
.s plendor. I have a suit of 7 rooms , and with Ca llagh .r 
a b out to l eave for good next We dnesday, I shal l be a l on e . 
My of f ice is about as big a s the Riggs annex. With one 
pr iva t e secretary, two typists , a cook, housekeepe r, a nd 
o n e maid, I will try to worry along in the vita secularis 
which we live here among t he Bolsheviks . There is not an-
other S.J. within a thousand miles. 
To this off ice are now being r e ferred all questions 
between the Vatican and the Soviets, questions which a r e 
daily increasing as the Vatican is endeavoring to reo rg a n-
ize and save the chuiches after the storm of the Revolu -
·tion and ihe present equally destructive ieligious oppr es-
sion of the Bolsheviks. Vera est persecutio et diobo l ic a . 
For that reason the Vatican videtur velle potius Americ an-
urn ut legaturn suurn. P. Maas and the General w~re conc ern-
ed when I was in Rome in July as it looked as 1f th e 
Vatican · were seriously thinking of naming E.A.W. Epi s c opum 
vel Delegaturn Aposto licurn (Episcoplern) in Russia. ~ h ad 
a lona audience with the Holy Father on the whole s1tua-
ti;n,~one hour and thirty minutes, and He promised to 
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appoint a Bishop or o ther representative within the 
next week or so. But now almost three months have 
passed and nobody has shown up and as a result the old 
fears are beginning to be felt that the Vatican may 
say that E.A.W. has been there almost two years and 
knows the situation etc. These are not vain fears, nor 
what Shvne would call 11 B. S. 11 but hard facts. The onl v 
thing t~ do is to npull a bone 11 at once. .. 
I understand_ all you write about Foreign Service 
2n d am very uneasy . . .. I will certainly make a de ter-
illined effor t to settle u~ the Vatican affairs he rG in 
time to get back by second term if humanl y possible. I 
have never asked to be relieved as so many have failed 
on this Ru ssian mission tha.t I could not in conscience 
a dd another to the embarrassments of the Vatican. But 
at the first indication that the job is done, I will be 
on my -...-1ay . ( 11 The Rev . Edmund _ A. Walsh , _ s-. J ~ , Papers , 11 
Box 2 Folder 94, Special Collections Div i sion, 
G~orgetown University Library.) 
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